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PREFACE 
Recently, there has been speculation, both psycho-
logical and physiological, as to the function of the human 
eyeblink. Specifically, it has been suggested that the eye-
blink might serve an "eraser" or masking function in visual 
perception, as well as for visual imagery. It is the latter 
function of the human eyeblink to which the present thesis 
addresses itself. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his 
major adviser, Dr. Robert Weber, for his continuous en-
couragement and advice in the design and analysis of this 
thesis. Appreciation is also expressed to the other 
committee members, Dr. Robert Stanners, Dr. Larry Hochhaus, 
and Dr. Leroy Folks, for their assistance in the prepara-
tion of the final manuscript. 
Finally, a special note of gratitude to my wife 
Mary, without whose continual encouragement and typing 
expertise, this thesis would not have been completed. 
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Blinking in organisms has been defined as a protective 
mechanism, involving movements of the upper and lower lid, 
resulting in their temporary (.13 to .20 sec.) closure 
(Duke-Elder, 1968; Hall, 1936). It has been noted (Duke-
Elder, 1968; Blount, 1928; Ponder & Kennedy, 1927), that 
the frequency of blinking varies in accord with both the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of organisms. 
Hence, animals below the vertebrates on the phylogenetic 
scale do not give evidence of blinking activity. Within 
the class vertebrates, the lower forms (aquatic verte-
brates) .do not exhibit blinking activity. In general, 
blinking appears to be characteristic of all vertebrates 
living in contact with air and possessing eyelids. Excep-
tions to this generalization appear to be that of some 
reptiles. Blount (1928) noted differences in the blinking 
activity of land animals, based upon whether they were 
the hunted (herbivora) or the hunters (carnivora). It was 
reported that the former class of land animals gave evi~ 
dence .of a mean blink rate in excess of five times that 
of the latter. Further, Blount (1928) also reported that 
the arboreal primates possessed blink rates as high as 
four times that of the herbivora. Thus, it seems that 
as one ascends the phylogenetic scale, the blink rate 
tends to increase. Ontogenetically- the blink rate appears 
to evolve, at least in humans, in a way similar to that 
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of its phylogenetic development, e.g. increasing as one 
ascends the scale. Duke-Elder (196$) reported that blink-
ing movements, save those of a reflexive nature, remain 
undeveloped in human infants until approximately age six 
months. Similarly, Hall (1945) reported that until binoc-
ular vision and fixation have extablished themselves in the 
human infant, the blink rate does not differ from that of 
the lower animals. In general, it appears that the blink 
rate increases with the phylogenetic and ontogenetic de-
velopment, and this may implicate the eyeblink in an 
organism's ability to receive, encode and process visual 
infl.orma tion from its environment. 
Additional information which would seem to implicate 
the eyeblink in the processing of_visual information comes 
from the observations of Hall (1945) and Ponder and Kennedy 
(1927). It was noted that the human blink rate varied 
considerably, as a function of the activity that an indivi-
dual was engaged in. Both Ponder and Kennedy (1927) and 
Hall (1945) reported immediate changes in blink rate when 
an individual changed his activity from conservation to 
reading, with the blink rate during conversation being 
eight times higher, on the average, than the blink rate 
for reading. Also, Ponder and Kennedy (1927) reported 
findings that would place some question on the importance 
of blinking for keeping the cornea moist. The blink rates 
of Ss were observed in an arid environment and also in a 
humid environment. Presumably, if the blink serves to 
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moisten the cornea, the blink rates in the two environments 
should differ, with the blink rate in an .arid environment 
being higher. However no differences in blink rate were 
observed. Once again, such observations would seem to 
imply that the eyeblink may have some functional signifi-
cance for the processing of visual information. Duke-Elder 
(1968) concluded that the function of blinking appears to 
be threefold: it serves a protective role, in that it 
moistens the cornea, keeping it free from dirt and debris; 
it promotes the drainage of tears; and it may tend to 
eliminate the blurring of images during actual movements 
of the eyes. 
Several researchers (Mower, 1933; Jung, 1972; Yarbus, 
1967; Blount, 1928; Barlow, 1964; Davson, 1963; Stephenson, 
1966) have offered hypotheses as to the significance of the 
eyeblink, as it relates to visual perception. Mower (1933) 
found that eyemovements were accompanied by either partial 
or complete closures of the eyelids. Further observations 
indicated that, at least the more extensive saccadic move-
' 
ments and blinking occurred together. Mower (1933) 
offered two hypotheses to account for the above observa-
tions. The first, suggested that blinking occurs because 
it has been inhibited during the prior fixation. However, 
this suggestion is somewhat suspect when one considers the 
findmng reported by Ponder and Kennedy (1927) that the im-
pulse to blink may be abated by fixating on a new point. 
The second hypothesis offered by Mower (.1933) as to the 
function of blinking is that it may serve to eliminate. 
retinal images. A similar suggestion has been made by 
Blount (1928). 
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More recently, Jung (1972) has noted that saccadic 
eyemovements, besides serving the obvious function of V,is-
ual goal fixation, may supply information about the onset 
of a "new" visual stimulus. That is, each saccade, in 
centering the fovea on a different part of a visual stim-
ulus is, in a sense, producing a different visual stimulus. 
Also, it has been observed that pre-fixation saccades are 
accompanied by a blink (Jung, 1972; Yarbus, 1967). In 
light of this evidence, it has been suggested that each 
fixation period after a saccadic blink can be compared to 
stimulation by a "new" visual pattern at light onset. 
That is, it may be that neuronal discharge resulting from 
the fixation reflex may, in some way, provide a code which 
opens the visual pathways for information intake. Simi-
larly, the sudden light decrement caused by a blink during 
normal information processing may be considered equivalent 
to a laboratory stimulus at light offset. That is, the 
neuronal impulses which prevent information intake through 
some inhibitory process in the visual pathways. Similarly, 
Yarbus (1967) has suggested that a saccade or a blink may 
result in the cessation of certain retinal impulses and 
the reestablishment of others, with the implication 
that such a state of affairs could serve to open or close 
the visual pathways to information intake. Finally, 
Barlow (1964) has suggested that off discharges, resulting 
from a saccadic blink may serve a role in "clearing the 
visual screen" of a retinal image, prior to a subsequent 
fixation and the formation of another retinal image. 
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Jung (1972) has pointed out that the cancellation of 
previous images does not imply that information about those 
images is forgotten. Rather, it is assumed that such 
information should be sufficiently coded, processed and 
stored before the image is destroyed. It would seem that 
once the information from an image has been coded, pro-
cessing and storage of that information would be most 
efficiently accomplished during a time when the visual 
system is not capable of taking in additional information. 
Such a time, in light of the discussion thus far, may be 
during a saccadic blink and the subsequent saccade. 
Jung (1972) has concluded, that without cancellation of 
previous images and the properly timed onset of the new 
image, subsequent saccades might result in multiple repre-
sentations of the visual surround. This, it is thought, 
would be experienced as something much like double vision. 
Additionally, Davson (1963) and Stephenson (1966), 
in noting that movements of the eyes are accompanied by 
blinking, state that blinking may serve to aid the eyes in 
changing their fixation point. As Davson points out, 
lesions of the frontal motor center make the cha~ging 
of the fixation point difficult, but that the change may 
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be brought about by cutting off the visual stimulus through 
blinking the eyes. Therefore, it is possible, that in the 
normal individual, blinking is an aid, although not a 
necessary one, in inhibiting the fixation reflex, prior to 
the adoption of a new fixation point. These results are 
interesting in light of Jung's (1972) suggestion that a 
saccade alone may be responsible for the extinction of 
previous visual information. For even if this is the case, 
the relationship between blinking and fixation reported 
by Davson (1963) and Stephenson (1966) would still tie 
blinking, although indirectly, to the "clearing of the 
visual screen". Therefore, on the basis of the physio-
logical theory discussed, it would seem reasonable to 
postulate some sort of "erasure" function for the eyeblink 
in the processing of visual information, from stimuli 
physically present in an individual's environment. 
More recently, the results of several studies 
(Barron, 1973; Malstrom, 1973; Wegmann & Weber, 1973), 
have suggested a similar "erasure" function of the eyeblink 
for the processing of imagined visual information. 
Generally, the findings have been that individuals, 
characteristically, blink less during information pro-
cessing in a ,:.v..~sual imagery· task than,· .they do before or 
after the task. One might hypothesize that such findings 
indicate blinking, in some. way,· "breaks up" or "erases" 
the visual image. Additional support for the proposed 
"erasure" function of the human eyeblink, with respect to 
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the processing of imagined visual information, comes from 
the observations of Leask, Haber and Haber (1969). It was 
reported that in questioning children possessing eidetic 
imagery, several individuals reported that they "con-
trolled" or "eliminated" interferring images by blinking 
their eyes. However, an erasure function for blinking, 
with respect to visual imagery, would seem more plausible 
if similarities between ocular activities for visual 
perception and visual imagery tasks could be established, 
in that the arguments for an erasure hypothesis, thus 
far, have been in the context of visual perception. 
Both Moore (1903) and Perky (1910) reported that the 
eyes of people imagining scenes ~ith their eyes closed 
did not remain stationary. Jacobson (1932) reported that 
the activity of the extraocular muscles during an imagery 
task was similar to the activity of those muscles dis-
played during visual perception. Additionally, Totten 
(1935) concluded that the eyes followed the contours of 
the pattern that was being imagined. Lorens and Darrow 
(1962) found marked increases in eye movements during 
mental arithmetic, while Antrobus, Antrobus and Singer 
(1964) found increased eye movements in 2s asked to imagine 
moving events relative to static events. Deckert (1964) 
reported similarities in pursuit eye movements for Ss 
imagining and then actually watching a pendulum. However, 
subsequent studies (Brown, 1968; Lenox, Lange & Graham, 
1970) failed to corroborate Deckert•.s (1964) findings. 
Zikmund (1972) points out that these studies have too 
many methodological omissions for meaningful comparisons 
to be made. Zikmund (1972) concludes thct there exists 
a certain similarity between the physiological processes 
underlying visual perception and those occurring while 
sensory experience of vivid visual imagery takes place. 
Further, evidence suggests that the oculomotor components 
of visual perception are reactivated during ·vivid visual 
imagery. Therefore, on the basis of the above evidence, 
it would ~eem reasonable to assume that the hypothesized 
erasure function of blinking, presented by Jung (1972), 
with respect to visual perception, is also plausible for 
visual imagery. With the possibility of the proposed 
erasure hypothesis established, at a theoretical level, 
it remains to examine the literature concerned with the 
human eyeblink. 
A good number of the earliest researches with regard 
to blinking used reading as the task. As mentioned earlier, 
both Pondor and Kennedy (1927) and Hall (1945) observed 
substantial decreases in blink rate when individuals 
were engaged in a reading task as opposed to conversation. 
Additionally, Hall (1945) observed the places in the text 
where individuals blinked. Interestingly, results in-
dicated that most often blinks occurred at punctuation 
marks and next most often at the turning of a page. This 
finding would seem to be in line with the notion that 
blinking may signal the end of a discrete thought process 
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(Yarbus, 1967), and make for a convenient point at which 
to "erase" the image and provide "dead time" for processing 
and storage of the information from the image. Also, 
Hall (1945) reported that those .§.s classified as "good" 
readers tended to follow the blinking pattern described 
above more consistantly than did those Ss classified as 
"bad" readers. In fact, a substantial number of the "bad" 
readers gave no evidence of blinking at all, during the 
reading task. From an erasure point of view, this suggests 
that subsequent images might interfere with previous ones 
as well as pointing to the idea of blinking providing. 
"dead time" to be used for processing and storage of 
information. 
The studies to be reviewed next attempted to relate 
changes in blink rate to attentional changes in the indiv-
idual. It was generally thought that blink rate was 
inversely related to attention. Luckeish (1940) reported 
that blinking increased when .§.swore lenses which caused a 
blurring of retinal images. It would seem difficult to 
interpret this finding in terms of an attentional position, 
in that it appears that such a position would expect a 
decrease in blinking with blurred images. That is, extrac-
ting information from a blurred image would seem to be 
a more difficult task than extraction of information from 
a "normal" retinal image and would require a greater de-
gree of attention on the part of the individual. Poulton 
and Gregory (1952) observed the blink rate of Ss engaged 
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in a visual tracking task. The findings were that the 
blink rate was elevated before and after, but supressed 
during the task. These findings are similar to the 
findings of more recent studies in vol vinf.: imagery tasks 
(Malstrom, 1973; Wegmann & Weber, 1973). Additionally, 
Poulton and Gregory (1952) manipulated the blink activity 
of the Ss. In one manipulation, .§.s were instructed to 
blink voluntarily while engaged in the task. The second 
manipulation involved occluding the display from the .§.s 
for short periods. Both manipulations resulted in de-
creased performance on the tracking task. Poulton and 
Gregory (1952) suggested that the observed changes in blink 
rate were due to fluctuations of attention. However, it 
could be assumed that the decreased performance observed 
was due to the fact that the voluntary and simulated blink-
ing was ill timed. As Jung (1972) has stated, the timing 
of saccades and saccadic blinks is crucial to insure 
proper encoding, processing and storage of information 
from a retinal image. Still, the findings of Poulton and 
Gregory (.1952) seem reasonable from an attentional point 
of view. It could be·argued that forcing a subject to 
blink, or occluding the display from him was distracting 
and resulted in attentional fluctuations. Drew (1951), 
in examining the effect of a visual motor task upon the 
blink rate, found that, for all .§.s, the blink rate 
varied inversely with the difficulty of the task. Further, 
it was observed that, when the speed and difficulty of the 
of the task were varied, blinking occurred before and 
after, while being suppressed during the difficult task 
periods. Gregory (1952) investigated changes in blink 
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rate during and between three "non-visual" tasks. It was 
observed that the blink rate fell below its resting rate 
during each task and increased above resting rate be-
tween each task. If the tasks were truly non-visual, 
the above results would be detrimental to an erasure 
hypothesis. However, at least two of the tasks, stylus 
maze and mental multiplication, would appear to have had 
some imagined visual components. If this is the case, 
then the results are consistant with previously reported 
findings (Malstrom, 1973; Wegmann & Weber, 1973) and 
appear to be just as interpretable in terms of an erasure 
hypothesis as they are in terms of an attentional hypo-
thesis. Finally, Glaser and Kennard (1962), using a visual 
detection task, reported that reduction of blink rate is 
related to increases of attention. The studies reported 
above have sought to relate the human eyeblink to atten-
tional changes in the organism. However, it would seem 
that a good deal of the findings are as interpretable 
in terms of an erasure hypothesis as they are in terms 
of an attentional position. 
The findings of several other studies would seem to 
go against a position relating blinking to attentional 
changes. Wood and Bitterman (1950), using Tinker's (1945) 
speed reading test, found the blink rate was lower for 
slow as opposed to fast processing of written material. 
It would appear that attentional demands should increase 
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as the speed of processing increases and from an attentional 
point of view, the prediction would be that the blink 
rate should decrease. The findings of Wood and Bitterman 
(1950) however, would appear to make sense in terms of an 
erasure hypothesis. Recall that Hall (1945) reported that 
"good" readers tended to blink most often at the occur-
rences of punctuation marks in a line of print. It was 
suggested that this pattern of blinking might provide an 
individual with a relatively meaningful "chunk" of informa-
tion to encode, with the "dead time" provided by the sub-
sequent saccade and blink allowing for efficient processing 
and storage of that bit of information. Therefore, as 
the speed of processing increases, and bits of information 
are taken in more rapidly, it would be expected that the 
blink rate would increase. Sidowski and Nuthmann (1961) 
found that blin~s decreased with trials of a verbal learning 
task. Again, it would seem that as .learning· 1proceeds,- the 
attentional requirements for Ss would decrease. Under 
such conditions, it would seem that an attentional position 
would then predict an increase in blinking rather than the 
observed decrease. Clites (1935) also has presented data 
which appear problematic, both for an attentional as well 
as for an erasure hypothesis. Using three water dipping 
problems, it was observed that Ss who succ.essfully solved 
the problems blinked more rapidly during the presentation 
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of the problems than during subsequent solution periods. 
Those 2s who failed to solve the problems showed no dif-
ference in blink rate for the presentation versus the 
solution periods. In accord with an attentional approach, 
it would seem that the blink rate should remain relatively 
constant from presentation through solution. This would 
seem plausible, in that, Ss would have to attend to both the 
presentation as well as the solution of the problem. 
Further, observations by Clites (1935) indicated that 
blinking decreased for weight lifting and weight checking 
tasks, while increasing for saying the alphabet forward or 
bachward, and for mental multiplication. These latter 
results appear detrimental to an erasure hypothesis. Last, 
Baumstimler and Parrot (1971) investigated the effect of 
the execution of a motor response upon blinking. It was 
found that blinking was inhibited until the response had 
been completed. The task required the Ss to monitor the 
response apparatus without looking at it. Therefore, it 
seems tenable that the inhibition of blinking could have 
been due to the S's having to imaginally.reconstruct the 
response apparatus, and maintaining that reconstruction 
until the response was executed. 
The last group of studies to be reviewed will be 
those that investigated the effects of various imagery 
tasks on the eyeblink activity of individuals. Antrobus, 
Antrobus and Singer (.1964) carried out an investigation of 
the effect of different forms of mentation upon eye movement 
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and blinking activity in individuals. It was found that 
the blink rate was twice as high for active thinking as for 
passive thought. Additionally, blinking was significantly 
greater for the active thinking periods, relative to wish 
supression episodes. With respect to visual imagery in-
structions, it was observed that both eye movement and 
blinking were significantly greater for active versus static 
scenes. It was suggested that the observed differences in 
eye movement and blinking may have been related to cog-
nitive change, but that such changes may have reflected 
emotional arousal. Holland and Tarlow (1972) investigated 
changes in blink rate as a function of memory load. In 
the first study, 2s were shown digit strings and asked to 
remember them, using visual imagery, for later recall. 
It was found that blinking was greater preceeding incorrect 
versus correct responses. The latter finding suggests that 
incorrect responses were possibly due to the increased 
blinking which eliminated a S's visual image of a digit 
string. In the second study (Holland & Tarlow, 1972) 
which used a mental addition task, it was again observed 
that incorrect responses were preceeded by more blinking 
activity than were correct responses. Holland and Tarlow 
interpreted their findings as indicating that blinking, in 
some fashion, is disruptive of, at least some cognitive 
processes. Holland and Tarlow do not, however, specify or 
hypothesize as to the nature of such disruption. Some re-
15 
cent studies however, have made attempts to specify the 
disruptive nature of blinking upon certain forms of cog-
nition. Malmstrom (1973) observed the blinking activity of 
individuals under perceptual and imagery presentation con-
ditions for spatial, non-spatial, and directional problems. 
Under all treatment combinations it was found that blink-
ing was suppressed during stimulus presentation and re-
sponse intervals, with burats of blinks occurring in the 
following recovery interval. It was suggested that the 
eyeblink may serve the function of an "eraser". Barron 
(1973) also employed a visual imagery task, and found 
that the blink rate was suppressed during task intervals 
relative to pre- and post-task intervals. Finally, Wegmann 
& Weber (1973), using an imagery task, ob::erved that the 
blink rate was suppressed' during the task period relative 
to the pre- and post-task periods. Also, as with the 
findings of Barron (1973), it was found (Wegmann & Weber, 
1973) that the post-task blink was higher than the blink 
rate during the pre-task period. It was hypothesized that 
blinking may serve an "erasure" function in the processing 
of imagined visual information. It was also observed 
(Wegmann & Weber, 1973) that as the amount of information 
to be processed increased, or as the spatial representation 
of the information became more complex, performance de-
creased. 
It would seem that in view of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence presented, a study investigating the 
hypothesis that blinking may serve an erasure function for 
the processing of imagined visual information, would be a 
reasonable one. Much of the existing empirical data, it 
seems, could fit an erasure interpretation. To date how-
ever, the results of studies cited in this introduction 
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have only been suggestive of such an interpretation, in 
addition to being amenable to a position relating the eye-
blink to the process.of attention. The reason that the 
specific effect of the eyeblink, with respect to visual in-
formation processing, has not been resolved seems due to the 
fact that, to date, it has been used as a dependent variable. 
Such a situation only allows one to note that fluctua-
tions in blinking do, in fact, occur with changes in the 
activity that a person is engaged in, but do not allow one 
to investigate the specific nature of the observed changes. 
Therefore, the present study used the eyeblink as an in-
dependent variable, in an attempt to specify the role 
which the eyeblink plays in the processing of imagined vis-
ual information. 
The present study examined the erasure hypothesis by· 
experimentally manipulating an individual's blink activity 
either prior to an imagery task or during the task. With 
respect to the first manipulation, it has been noted 
(Wegmann & Weber, 1973) that .§.s tended to blink more often 
as the beginning of a trial approached. This was inter-
preted as indicating that Ss may have been attempting to 
clear their "visual screens" just prior to the beginning 
_17 
of the trial. Assuming the interpretation is valid, it 
is predicted that, preventing a S from blinking just prior 
to the beginning of a trial should result in poorer per-
formance, in that the S would not have the opportunity to 
rid his visual system of extraneous visual information, 
prior to the trial. Secondly, it is hypothesized that, 
performance should decrease if an Sis required to blink 
while attempting to perform an imagery task, in that blink-
ing during the task would result in the bre:aking up of the 
images that the S was attempting to form. Lastly, it is 
hypothesized that performance on the imagery task would 
decrease as the amount of material to·be processed increases 
and as the complexity of the spatial representation of 
that material increases. 
Method 
Subjects 
The Ss for the present experiment consisted of 80 
undergraduate volunteers, 40 males and 40 females. All 
were enrolled in an introductory general psychology or 
introductory experimental psychology course at Oklahoma 
State University. All participants received course credit 
for their participation in the study. Those Ss who wore 
eyeglasses or contact lenses were asked to remove them prior 
to participating in the study. Fourteen potential Ss 
were dropped from further participation, after the prac-
tice trials, due to their inability to perform the task. 
Apparatus 
The eyeblinks of each Sin the present study were 
measured by means of an eye movement monitor (Biometrics, 
Inc., model SGH/V-2). Blinks were recorded on grid line 
chart paper, using a 10 speed chart mover, model 485 
(Harvard Apparatus Co., Inc., special product 2045), in 
conjunction with a Harvard Apparatus recorder, model 350 
(Harvard Apparatus Co., Inc.). Events for each trial were 
manually recorded by the E, on the grid line chart paper. 
For this, a Harvard Apparatus Event/Time Marker Module, 
model 283 (Harvard Apparatus Co., Inc.) in conjunction with 
an Electro Snap microswitch, model E4-3, was used. 
Additionally, all Ss were asked to place their chins into 
a chin rest (Biometric, Inc., model 115) at the beginning 
of each trial. A large sheet of white construction paper 
was attached to the frame of the chin rest so as to provide 
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a ganzfeld in the front and lateral visual fields of the 
Ss to eliminate distractions and prevent the use of physical 
objects as matrices. 
Procedure and Materials 
The Ss were informed that they would be required 
to imagine a number being traced out in a three by three 
matrix, each cell of which had been given a name (Fig. la.). 
To trace out a letter, a· S was presented with a series of 
cell names of the matrix, and asked to imagine drawing a 
line from the center of one cell to the center of the next 
cell he heard called out, until the sequence of cell names 
had ended (Fig.lb.). In all cases, letters were traced 
out such that, a given move was to a cell adjacent to the 
one moved from. That is, in all cases, the sequence of 
cell moves was such that, the required visualization pro-
cess would approximate the required spatial properties of 
the letters, we·re .they to be actually written on a piece 
of paper. 
To accustom the Ss to the task, each received eight 
practice trials, without any concurrent activity required. 
The stimuli for these eight practice trials consisted of 
the digits 1 through 9. Initially, the task was explained 
to the Ss (Appendix A) and they were provided a sheet with 
a printed matrix on it, with the cells of the matrix 
labelled (Appendix B). They were then allowed to study 
the matrix until they were confident that they could iden-
tify the spatial location of a cell given only its name. 
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UPPER 'l'WELVE UPPER 
LEFT O'CLOCK RIGHT 
NINE CENTER THREE O'CLOCK O'CLOCK 
LOWER SIX LOWER 
LEFT O'CLOCK RIGHT 
Fig. la. 3X3 matrix with associated cell labels 
Sheard 2 was to imagine 
1. "UPPER LEFT" 
2. "NINE O'CLOCK" 
3 • "LOWER LEFT" 
4. "SIX O'CLOCK" 
5. "LOWER RIGHT" 
Fig. lb. Example of an experimental message 
and its imaginal counterpart 
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Following this, the S was provided with a sheet illustra-
ting how ·each number would look, if traced out in the 
matrix using a series of cell names (Appendix E). To in-
sure that the S attended to the sheet of numbers, he was 
required to call out the cell names that each number occu-
pied, in the order indicated on the sheet. Further, the E 
informed the S that if a number was traced out, it would 
be done using the sequence of cell names indicated on the 
sheet, for that number. The S was then instructed to 
place his finger on the first cell that was called out 
over the tape, and to continue tracing from cell to cell, 
with his finger, as the remaining cells were called out. 
At the conclusion of the sequence, the S was asked to re-
spond by calling out the number that had been traced out. 
Following this, the sheet of numbers placed in the matrix 
was returned to the s, with the instruction to look at the 
number 5, noting the cells of the matrix it occupied. The 
Ethen took the sheet back from the Sand told him to 
trace out the number 5 by calling out the appropriate 
cell names, starting at the 12 o'clock position. 
Next, the£ was given a diagram illustrating the 
sequence of events for each of the eight practice trials 
(Appendix F). The S was told that there would be a 
"ready" called out over the tape, to signal the beginning 
of a trial. This was followed by a blank interval of 
variable length such that it was of the same duration of 
time as would expire between the beginning and the end of 
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the sequence of cells. Following the variable interval, 
the first cell of the sequence was called out. This was 
followed by a two sec. delay, and S was informed that he 
was expected to form an image of the matrix and the start-
ing cell of the sequence, in the two sec. delay period. 
The S was then told that, following the two sec. delay, 
the remaining cells of the sequence would be called out at 
a rate of two per sec •. Once the sequence was finished, 
its end would be signalled by the word "start" called out 
over the tape. Each S was informed that the occurrence 
of "start" signaled the end of the sequence, as well as 
the beginning of the response period. The S was then told 
that following "start" he would hear "one", "two", "stop", 
called out over the tape (an interval of three sec.), 
with "stop" signalling the end of a trial. The S was told 
to respond at any time between "start" and "stop". This 
would be followed by a delay of 20 sec. until the begin-
ning of the next trial. 
Additionally, Ss were told to sit forward, placing 
their chin in the chin rest, remaining in that position un-
til they heard "stop" at the end of the trial. At that 
time, Ss were instructed to sit back and relax, until they 
heard the next ready. Also, Ss were told to sit with their 
hands folded together throughout the experiment and to 
keep their head motionless, while in the chin rest. These 
instructions were intended to prevent any tactual or 
kinesthetic processing of the verbal messages. At the con-
clusion of the initial eight practice trials, .Ss who had 
not obtained at least three of the eight numbers correct 
were excused from participation in the remainder of the 
experiment. 
Following the initial eight practice trials, each S 
then underwent another series of four practice trials. 
The stimuli were again numbers, but the S was required to 
engage in the concurrent activity to which he had been 
randomly assigned (blink, tap, suppress, no instruction) 
at the locus of the trial to which he had also been ran-
domly assigned (pre-task or during the task). The Ss 
were instructed to tap or blink in time with the reading 
of the cell sequence, two blinks or taps per sec •• To 
illustrate the addition of the concurrent activity and 
its locus in·the trial, the 2 was shown one of two trial 
diagrams, in accord with his specific condition assign-
ment (Appendices G and H). 
.23 
At the conclusion of the practice trials, Ss were 
told that the procedures for the remainder of the trials 
would be identical to that of the last four practice trials, 
with the exception that the cell sequences would trace 
out block capital letters, rather than numbers. Numbers 
were used in the practice trials to insure that all sub-
jects would be equal, in terms of.letter familiarity 
at the beginning of the experimental trials. The S was 
then provided with a sheet illustrating how the letters of 
the alphabet would look if traced out in the matrix 
(Appendix I). Once again, to insure that the S studied 
the sheet, he was required to call out the names of the 
cells occupied by each letter, in the order indicated 
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on the sheet. Once this was done, the experimental trials 
began. 
Not all letters of the alphabet were utilized in the 
present study. Initially, the number of cell moves needed 
to trace out each letter in the matrix, in block form, 
was ascertained. Secondly, it was determined which of the 
letters of the alphabet were overlapping and which were 
non-overlapping. An overlapping letter was defined to be 
a letter, when being traced out, that required the S 
to imagine going back over an already imagined line, or 
crossing an already imagined line. Following the deter-
mination of the above letter characteristics, 12 letters 
of the alphabet were selected for use in the present study. 
Of the 12 selected, six of the letters took eight cell 
moves to trace out. These six letters were defined to be 
long letters. Of the six long letters, three had the 
property of being overlapping (E, H, I), with the remaining 
three being defined as non-overlapping (G, O, S). Of the 
remaining six letters selected for use, two took four cell 
moves (Y, L), two took five cell moves (T, J), and two 
took six cell moves (X, U). This latter group of letters 
was defined as the short group. For this group, one of 
the two letters in each of the three pairs comprising the 
group was an overlapping letter (Y, T, X), with the re-
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maining letters of the group being defined as non-overlap-
ping (L, J, U). Each of the selected letters was presented 
to the Ss twice, via a tape recorder and headphones, the 
order of presentation being randomly determined. 
Results 
Prior to the analysis of the data from the experi-
mental trials, the practice data was analyzed. The data 
were analyzed as a completely randomized design (Kirk, 
1968, p. 104) with groups as the main factor, with eight 
levels. The data were expressed in terms of percentage 
correct and therefore an arc sine transformation was per-
formed on the data prior to the analysis. The analysis of 
the practice data is summarized in Table 1. Examination 
of Table 1 shows that the eight groups did not differ 
significantly, F(7,72) = 1.278, E<.27, with respect to 
performance on the imagery task, without concurrent 
activity. 
Following the analysis of the practice data, the data 
collected in the experimental trials was analyzed, using 
a SPF pq • rv (Kirk, 1968, p. 311) design (4X2X2X2). The 
between factors were concurrent activity (blinking, tapping, 
suppression, or no instruction) and locus of activity 
(prior to the beginning of a message or during a message). 
The within factors were message length (long-eight steps 
versus short-four, five, or six steps) and complexity 
(overlapping versus non-overlapping messages). Once again, 
an arc sine transformation was performed on the data 
(percentage correct score) prior to the analysis. The 
analysis of the data from the experimental trials is 
summarized in Table 2 and graphically presented in Figure 
2. Examination of Table 2 shows that message length was 
a significant factor, F(l,72) = 40.078, E<.0001. Corre-
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Table 1 
AOV for practice trials performance data 
Source a:r SS MS F 
Groups 7 2.0175 0.2882 1.2781 
Error 72 16.2358 0.2254 
Total 79 18.2534 0.2310 
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Table 2 
AOV for experimental trials performance data 
Source a:r SS MS·-- F 
Concurrent Activity (A) 3 3.6754 1.2251 1.2721 
Activity Locus (D) 1 1.4862 1.4862 1. 5432 
A*D 3 0.6907 0.2302 o. 2390 
Error a 72 69.3397 0.9630 
Length (B) 1 11. 5539 11.5339 40.0789* 
A*B 3 1.6419 0.5473 1.8985 
D*B 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
A*D*B 3 0.4724 0.1574 0.5463 
Error b 72 20.7560 0.2882 
Complexity (C) 1 0.2422 0.2422 o.6829 
A*C 3 0.3871 0.1290 0.3637 
D*C 1 0.0070 0.0070 0.0197 
A*D*C 3 0.0455 0.0151 0.0427 
Error c 72 25.5433 0.3547 
B*C 1 6.5701 6. 5701 23.2486* 
A*B*C 3 0.7084 0.2361 0.8356 
D*B*C 1 0.0328 - 0.0328 0.1161 
A*D*B*C 3 1.8977 0.6325 2. 2383 
Error d 72 20. 3476 0.2826 
Total 319 165. 3987 0.5184 
* p < .0001 
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spondingly, Figure 2 shows that the mean number of short 
messages correct was 4.57, as opposed to a mean of 3.71 
long messages correct. Also 1 inspection of Table 2 re-
veals that the length by complexity interaction was sig-
nificant, F(l,72) = 23.248, :e.<.0001. Accordingly, a 
simple effects analysis for the factors length and com-
plexity was carried out. The results of the analysis are 
summarized in Table 3. From inspection of Table 3, it can 
be seen that there was not a significant effect of length 
for non-overlapping messages, F(l,72) = 1.398, :e.<.10. 
The mean number of short, non-overlapping messages correct 
was 4.30, as opposed to 4.06 for long, non-overlapping 
messages correct. There was, however, a significant 
effect of length for overlapping messages, F(l,72) = 
62.271, :e.<.Ol. Here, the mean number of messages correct 
was 4.85 and 3.35 for the short, overlapping and long, 
overlapping messages, respectively. Also, the effect of 
complexity was significant for both long and short mes-
sages. It was found that short overlapping messages (X = 
4.85) were significantly easier to process than short non-
overlapping me;sages (X = 4.30), F(l,72) = 6.729, E. <.05. 
Further, long non-overlapping messages were easier to 
process (X = 4.06) than were long overlapping messages 
(X = 3.35), F(l,72) = 14.647, E.<.Ol. 
Next, the eyeblink data collected from the no 
instruction groups was analyzed. Prior to the analysis, 
the average blink rate was determined for each S for the 
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Table 3 
Simple effects analysis for the length 
by complexity interaction 
Source 
Length for 
non-overlapping messages 
Length for 
overlapping messages 
Error 
Complexity for short 
messages 
Complexity for long 
messages 
Error 
ar ss Ms F 
1 0.3993 0.3993 _ 1. 3989 
1 17.7747 l7j7747 62.2709** 
72 0.2854 
1 4.6679 4.6679 6.7292* 
1 4.6679 4.6679 14.6473** 
72 0.3186 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
pre-task, task, and post-task periods. Figure 3 depicts 
the mean blink rate for the no instruction groups. In-
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spection of Figure 3 clearly shows that the blink rate 
during the imagery task was considerably lower (X = 2.486) 
than the blink rate for the pre-task period (X = 9.012) 
or the post-task period (X = 9.049). The eyeblink data 
was analyzed as a single factor, randomized block design 
Kirk, 1968, p. 131), with the factor, period, having 
three levels (pre-task, task, post-task).· The analysis 
is summarized in Table 4. In looking at Table 4, it can 
be seen that the blink rates across the three periods 
differed significantly. In light of the significant period 
factor, planned, non-orthogonal, pair-wise comparisons 
(Dunn's procedure; Kirk, 1968, p. 79) were made. The 
multiple comparison indicated that the mean blink rates 
for the pre- and post-task periods differed significantly 
from the mean blink rate during the task period, but not 
from one another, d = 6.525, xpre - xtask = 6.526~ xpost -
Xtask = 6.563, Xpre - Xpost = .037. The results of the 
multiple comparisons are summarized in Table 5. 
A composite confusion matrix for all presentation 
groups was prepared and appears as Table 6. The columns 
of Table 6 represent the letters actually traced out, 
while the rows of the table correspond to the response 
given by the Ss. Please note, the most frequent error for 
each letter is starred. Inspection of Table 6 shows that 
the mo.st prevelant errors, for any given letter, shared 
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Table 4 
AOV for control Ss blink rates for pre-, task, 
and-post-task periods 
Source a±· ss MS I F 
Subjects 19 1379.4072 72.6003 
Periods 2 571.1300 285.5650 27.4915**** 
Residual 38 394.7199 10.3873 
Total 59 2345.2572 39.7501 
**** p < . 0001 
Table 5 
Multiple comparisons of blink rates during 
pre-, task) and post-task periods 
xtask 
:X\ask 
X~ost-
ask 
x fre-
ask 
d 
Xfost-
. ask 
6.562* 
= 6.525 
Xp. re-t,ask 
6.526* 
0.037 
* p <. .05 
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Table 6 
Composite confusion matrix for Ss responses 
INPUT 
J 1 u T x y 0 s G H E I 
A 1 1 1 1 
B 1 3 3 4 2 2 1 
c 4 3 4 6 2 5* 1 9 4 
D 4 1 1 1 
E 1 1 6* 1 6 74 4 
F 1 1 1 
G 2 2 6 12* 2 115 2 5 2 
H 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 105 1 
I 4* 1 95 
J 107 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 2 
K 2 6* 1 2 1 9* 2 
L 5 132 7 2 1 1 
E-IM 1 1 1 2 2 
:::, N 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 
~o 1 8* 97 5* 1 5P 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Q 
R 1 1 2 
s 1 4 111 4 2 31* 2 
T 134 10* 3 1 1 2 19 
u 15* 1 106 1 $ 2 
v 1 1· 1 6 1 
w 2 1 5 1 2 2 2 1 2 
x 1 135 4 1 1 2 2 3 y 1 5* 6 120 1 1 2 2 5 
z 2 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 6 
11 10 10 11 7 14 15 21 13 13 24 9 
spatial properties with the letter actually given (e.g., 
U for J, T for Y). 
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Following the end of each experimental session, each 
S was asked whether or not the concurrent activity they 
had been asked to engage in aided or hindered their ability 
to perform the imagery task. If an S answered in the 
affirmative, he was then asked to elucidate on the nat.ure 
of the effect of the concurrent activity. While, overall, 
the results of the questioning did not yield any consistant 
results, some of the S's comments are interesting and 
suggestive. Specifically, two of the Ss in the suppress 
during condition, stated that they had fo::-gotten about 
the instruction to suppress their blinking during the 
task. However, examination of their blinking protocols 
indicated that they had not blinked during the task, during 
the experimental trials. Further, a Sin the blink during 
condition claimed that luminance changes created by blink-
ing broke up her visual images. Lastly, several Ss in the 
blink before condition said that blinking prior to the 
start of the message helped to "clear the mind". 
However, due to a question of the appropriateness of 
the analysis presented in table 2, given the pattern of 
randomization used in·the present study, an alternative 
analysis has been suggested. In contrast to using four 
error terms as outlined in Kirk (1968), it was thought a 
more appropriate procedure might have been to pool errors 
b, c, and d and use the pooled error in their place. 
Discussion 
While the main hypotheses of the present study 
(effect of concurrent activity and locus of activity on 
imagery) were not supported, the pattern of results is 
quite consistant with that reported in an earlier study 
(Wegmann & Weber, 1973). It was found that length was a 
significant factor, along with the first order length by 
complexity interaction. Further, the results of the 
simple effects analysis was also consistant with those 
: 
findings reported by Wegmann and Weber (1973), in that 
length was not a significant factor for non-overlapping 
messages, but was a significant factor for overlapping 
messages. The one finding of the present study, however, 
what was not found previously, was that complexity was a 
significant factor for both long and short messages. 
While the differences, with respect to complexity, were in 
the same direction in the present study and the earlier 
one (Wegmann & Weber, 1973), the earlier study had found 
no significant effect of complexity for either long or 
short messages. 
The finding that short overlapping letters tended to 
be easier to process than short non-overlapping letters, 
is at odds with the predicted results. However, a possi-
ble explanation for the unexpected result comes from the 
work of Garner (1970), in which an attempt was made to 
determine what differentiates a good pattern from a bad 
pattern. It was concluded that good patterns are those 
patterns which, because of their uniqueness, offer few 
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alternatives, when only partial informatior; is given. 
Garner's (1970) conclusions seem to hold for the letters 
used in the present study. It was found that, given only 
a partial sequence of cell moves (the first or last three) 
for a letter, that the mean number of possible letters 
that could be formed from short non-overlapping letters 
was 7.7 versus 5.8 possible letters that could be formed 
from partial sequences of short overlapping letters. 
The average number of letters that could be formed from 
the first or last three moves of a given class of letters 
was calculated in the following manner. .· For each letter 
in a given class the imaginal counterparts.for the partial 
sequence was determined and all the letters of the alpha-
bet which had such a configuration were totaled. The 
totals for each letter in the class were then add together 
and the mean for the letters in the class was calculated 
by dividing the sum by the number of letters in that class. 
Therefore, it seems that short overlapping letters are 
more distinctive, and hence should be easier to identify. 
Similarly, the mean number of possible letters, given a 
partial sequence, for the long overlapping and long non-
overlapping letters was 11.5 and 7.s respectively. Hence, 
long overlapping letters should be harder to identify than 
long non-overlapping letters. The results of the present 
study are consistant with the above predictions, based 
on Garner's work. 
Finally, the finding that the blink rate during the 
imagery task is significantly suppressed, relative to the 
pre- and post-task blink rate is consistant with the find-
ings of previous studies (Holland & Tarlow~ 1972; Wegmann 
i 
& Weber, 1973). The finding that the blink rate is 
systematically altered with respect to the information 
processing activities of the learner, suggests some con-
nection between information process and blinking. It 
was the purpose of the present study to examine the 
specific nature of that relationship. 
More explicitly, it was suggested that .the human 
eyeblink might serve an "erasure" function for th·e proces-
sing of imagined visual information. That is, the ele-
vated blink rate prior to the beginning of a trial may 
serve the purpose of clearing the visual registers prior 
to information intake, while the suppression of the blink 
rate during the task may allow the S _to retain and operate 
upon that information. Then, increased blinking following 
the trial may serve to rid the visual system of the no 
longer needed information. Such an interpretation does not 
appear viable, in light of the results of the present 
study. This is not to say, however, that blinking and in-
formation processing are unrelated. As has been alluded 
to earlier, it could be that blinking could be reflective 
of attentional fluctuations which may take place in the 
course of information processing. Alon~ these lines, 
Kahneman (1973) has suggested that blinks may reflect 
changes in mental content (e.g. internal versus external 
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orientation). 
One other possibility remains which could explain the 
failure of the present study. · It is entirely possible 
that the methodology employed was not sensitive enough 
to pick up the hypothesized differences. Surely, the 
cancellation and timing mechanisms (Jung, 1972) discussed 
in the introduction to the present study must take place 
very rapidly. Hence, the three second response interval 
allowed the Ss in the present study may have afforded them 
more than enough time to regenerate a clear image of a 
letter on which to base their response. Therefore, it is 
suggested that, rather than using a measure such as number 
of letters correct, it might be better to use a response 
latency measure. 
Also, the procedures employed in the present study 
did not allow for precise monitoring of a subject's blink-
ing behavior. There is some question as to whether the 
magnitude of the pen deflection of the recording equip-
ment used was indicative of the amount of lid closure or 
of the time course of lid closure. Hence, it is conceiv-
able that Ss may not have closed their lids fully, even 
though instructed to do so. Along these lines, it is 
interesting to note that the blinking protocols of several 
Ss changed during the course of the experiment, in the 
direction of decreased pen deflections. It is tempting 
to hypothesize that the changes noted in the blink protocols 
indicates that Ss were "fighting" a tendency not to blink. 
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However, the changes noted could have also been caused 
by slippage of the eyeglass frames upon which the infra-
red beam mechanisms were mounted. All in all, it would 
seem to be preferable to use a video tape recorder to 
record blinks. The pres,ent author has used such a system 
in the past, and it has proven quite reliable, while elim-
inating some of the more subjective aspects of scoring 
the blink protocols. 
One last observation is that, introspectively, the 
light to dark transition created by blinking the eyes is 
crucial to the effect of blinking on performance of an 
imagery task. The author has noticed that, while the abil-
ity to visually imagine seems impaired by blinking at a 
rate compatible to the rate of blinking required of Ss 
in the present study, the impairment seems more pronounced 
if the blink rate is slowed, making the light to dark 
transition more pro.nounced. These observations are in 
line with the theorizing of Yarbus (1967) with respect 
to the function of blinking in visual perception. Hence, 
it might be a profitable undertaking to investigate the 
effects of different rates of blinking upon performance 
of a visual imagery task. 
One other possibility exists which may serve to 
explain the failure to confirm the hypotheses of the pre-
sent study. It will be recalled that the physiological 
theory which proposed a cancellation function for the 
eyeblink was concerned with involuntary blinking. However, 
the present study was concerned with voluntary blinking. 
While the musculature for the two types of blinks appears 
to be'.the same, it could be that each type of blink gives 
rise to distinctly different patterns of neuronal firing. 
Hence, while the neuronal patterning of an involuntary 
blink might serve a cancellation function, it could well 
be the case that those neuronal patterns initiated by a 
voluntary blink may.not serve a cancellation function. 
43. 
The close examination of the methodology of the pre-
sent study seems warranted, in as much as there is no 
established literature focusing directly on the problem 
that was investigated in the present study. The fact 
that there does exist some published material,' which is, 
at worst, suggestive of the hypotheses advanced herein, 
along with compatible theorizing from a different field 
(physiology) would seem to give the hypotheses advanced 
in the present study a certain degree of plausibility. 
Hence, maybe it is not the hypotheses which should be 
discarded, but rather what is needed is a careful exam-
ination and alternation of the methodology employed. 
Summary 
The fact that past research (Holland & Tarlow, 1972; 
Wegmann & Weber, 1973) had been suggestive of some function-
al connection between the processing of-information and 
the human eyeblink, provided the impetus for the present 
study. More specifically, the present study focused 
attention on the eyeblink as an "erasure" mechanism, in 
the processing of imagined visual information. Secondarily, 
the study sought to examine possible stimulus character-
istics which might affect performance in ~n imagery task. 
Subjects were required to imagine tracing out a 
block capital letter in a ~hree by three matrix, given a 
sequence of cell names. In addition, Ss were required to 
engage in one of four types of concurrent activity 
(blinking, finger tapping, suppression of blinking, or no 
instruction), either prior to, or during the trial. It 
was predicted that blinking before a trial should enhance 
performance, while blinking during a trial should degrade 
it. The predictions for suppression of blinking were 
exactly opposite to those for the blinking activity. 
Finger tapping, it was predicted, should have little ef-
fect on performance, irrespective of its locus. With regard 
to the stimulus characteristics investigated, it was 
thought that both short and non-overlapping letters should 
be easier to process than long and overlapping letters. 
The results did not confirm the hypotheses advanced, 
with respect to concurrent activity, or locus of that 
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activity. However, it was found that long overlapping 
messages were more difficult to process than short over-
lapping messages. Further, it was found that short over-
lapping messages were easier to process than short non-· 
overlapping messages and that, with regard to long mes-
sages, the overlapping messages were more difficult to 
process. The former result is opposite of the prediction, 
and appears due to the uniqueness of the short overlapping 
letters used. Finally, the analysis of the control groups 
blink records indicated that the blink rat·e during the 
task was significantly lower than before or after the 
task. 
Based on the results of the present study, it must 
be concluded that the evidence does not point to the eye-
blink as an eraser. However, it was pointed out that fail-
ure to confirm the hypotheses advanced, could have been 
due to methodological difficulty and suggestions were 
offered to remedy the difficulties. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS TO Ss IN THE EXPERIMENT 
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This study concerns your ability to visually imagine 
The experiment is, in no way, a test of your IQ or person-
ality. You will be required to imagine a checkerboard 
matrix such as the bne on the sheet I have given you 
(Appendix B). Notice that the matrix has three rows and 
three columns. Also, notice that each cell of the matrix 
has a name. Note that the corner cells of the matrix are 
appropriately labelled up and down, right or left, and the 
center cell is simply labelled center. The remaining 
cells of the matrix are then labelled in a fashion simi-
lar to that of a clock (12 o'clock, 3 o'clock, 6 o'clock 
and 9 o'clock). It is essential that, after studying the 
matrix, you are able to imagine the position of a cell in 
the matrix upon hearing its name. At this time, please 
familiarize yourself with the cell positions and their 
associated labels (S was allowed, up to 1 minute for study). 
During the experiment, you will be required to imagine the 
matrix without the aid of a printed matrix. 
Basically, your task for the present study will 
require that you visually imagine a number being traced 
out in the matrix, by imagining you have drawn a line, 
connecting each of the cells you hear called out over the 
tape. The sheet I an now giving you illustrates how this 
is to be done (Appendix C). Please note, what appears 
on the left side of the sheet is what you will hear, while 
you are to imagine what appears on the right side of the 
sheet. Keep in mind that, throughout the experiment, 
you will not have the aid of any printed material to 
accomplish your task. It must be done entirely with your 
imagination. The next sheet I am giving you illustrates 
the idea that, in some instances, you may have to imagine 
going back over an already imagined line. (Appendix D). 
This is illustrated in the last three moves required to 
trace out the number one. 
This sheet illustrates how the number one to nine 
would look if traced out in the matrix, using the cell 
names (Appendix E). For each number, I would like you to 
call out the cells of the matrix the number occupies, in 
the order indicated on the sheet, to familiarize yourself 
with the numbers and their associated cell names. 
Now, I would like you to, using the printed matrix 
(Appendix B), to place your finger on the first cell you 
hear called out and continue tracing from cell to cell 
as the remaining cells are called out, telling me what 
number has been traced out. After the last cell has been 
called out, I will say start. This is your signal that 
the message is over and also your signal to respond. 
Now, would you please look at the number five on 
the sheet of numbers placed in the matrix (Appendix E), 
noting the cells of the matrix which the number occupies. 
Now, without looking at the sheet, and beginning at the 
12 o'clock position, would you trace out the number five, 
by calling out the appropriate cell names. Do you have 
any questions up to now? 
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If there are no questions, we are ready to begin a 
series of eight practice trials. But, before we begin, 
let me inform you of the sequence of events as they will 
occur on each trial. The sheet I am now giving you is a 
pictorial representation of a trial (Appendix F). At the 
beginning of each trial, you will hear "ready" called out 
over the tape. At this time sit forward, placing your 
chin in the chin rest, folding your hands together. 
"Ready" will be followed by a blank interval of variable 
length. At the end of the interval, a cell name will be 
called out, over the tape. This indicates the cell of the 
matrix you should begin imagining from for that trial. 
There will then be a two second delay, allowing you to 
form an image of the matrix, and your starting point in 
it. Following this delay, the remaining cells required 
to trace out the number will be called out, at a rate of 
two cells per second. After the last cell you will hear 
"start" on the tape. This signals that the number has 
been traced out, as well as indicating the beginning of 
the response period. After hearing "start", you will hear 
"one", "two", "stop" at one second intervals. Upon hear-
ing stop, remove your chin from the chin rest and sit back 
and relax, until you h.ear the next ready. It is extremely 
important that you call out the number you believe was 
traced out, before or simultaneous with hearing "stop" 
over the tape. Any response made after "stop" has occured 
will be counted incorrect. Following the end of each 
trial, there will be a delay of approximately 20 seconds 
before the beginning of the next trial. Are there any 
questions? 
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If not, let me give 'you some additional instructions 
and information before we begin. First, throughout the 
practice trials, I would like you to sit, hands folded 
together, from the time you hear "ready" until you hear 
"stop" for each trial. Next, let me repeat that it is im-
portant that you respond on each and every trial, even 
if your response is a pure guess. There is no penalty 
for guessing. But, respond before or simultaneous with 
hearing "stop" on the tape. Further, all trials will 
trace out a number in a manner similar to the way the number 
would be written on a piece of paper. Numbers will not 
be .. traced out upside down, backwards, etc. Before we 
begin, let me say that the task was designed to be dif-
ficult, so don't get discouraged. Are there any questions? 
If not let's begin. 
Instructions for the last four practice trials 
For the remaining four practice trials, everything 
will be the same, except that on each trial, I would like 
you to (tap your finger) in time with the metronome 
(blink your eyes) 
(not blink your eyes) 
(beginning when you hear ready on the tape, continuing 
(beginning when you hear the first cell called out, 
until the first cell is called out), following this period 
continuing until you hear stop), 
(return to normal eye activity), once again. The sheet I 
(fold your hands), 
am now giving you illustrates this change in procedure 
(Appendix G and H). 
This concludes the practice trials. For the ex-
perimental trials, everything will be the same as in the 
last four practice trials, with the exception that in-
stead of tracing out numbers, the sequences will trace out 
block capital letters. Here is a sheet illustrating how 
each letter of the alphabet would look in the matrix, 
if traced out using a sequence of cell names (Appendix I). 
Please note, several letters are not traced out. These 
letters will not be used in the experiment. Take a 
moment to study the sheet of letters, by calling out the 
names of the cells that each letter occupies, in the order 
indicated on the sheet. 
Before we start, let me remind you, that all trials 
will trace out a letter, and that the letters will not be 
upside-down, backwards, etc. Also, let me once again 
emphasize the importance of responding within the alloted 
time, guessing if you have to. Are there any questions? 
If not, let's begin. 
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THE MATRIX AND CELL LABELS 
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UP I 2 UP 
LEFT O'CLOCK RIGHT 
9 CENTER 3 
O'CLOCK O'CLOCK 
DOWN 6 DOWN 
LEFT O'CLOCK RIGHT 
APPENDIX C 
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The study of imagery and imaginal processes ha·s 
become an increasingly popular endeavor in the past few 
years. To convince oneself of this, one only needs to 
peruse the recent psychological literature. There are a 
number of books and journal articles summarizing imagery 
research up to and, in some instances, including 1971 
(Bower, 1972; Bulgelski, 1970; Horowitz, 1970; Paivio, 
1971; Reese, 1970; Segal, 1971; Sheehan, 1972). In light 
of existing reviews, the scope of the present paper will 
be limited to an examination of imagery research occurring 
from 1971 up to the present. As Kessel (1972) notes, 
the zeitgeist within psychology has become cognitive-
experiential in nature, resurrecting images as a legitimate 
output of the "psychic black box". However, along with 
the revival of imagery as a legitimate area of study for 
psychologists, has come controversy over the nature of 
imagery. The traditional conception, that of an image 
being a mental picture, has been supplanted by alternative 
conceptions offered by Neisser (1972) and Pylyshyn (1973). 
Neisser (1972) contends that the classical concep-
tion of imagery is much akin to the classical theories of 
perception. That is, imagery, like perception, is like 
looking at pictures, but looking at them for the second 
time. It is his contention that imagery is a constructive 
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process, much like the current thinking with regard to 
perception. Neisser's (1972) views with respect to im-
agery processes and the visual image derive from Gibson's 
views on perception. Gibson contends that it is the func-
tion of vision to provide information about the layout of 
the environment through various cues, rather than to provide 
a two-dimensional mossaic which is, in turn, interpreted 
by higher order processes. Neisser (1972), in line with 
the ideas advanced by Gibson, takes the position that, 
psychologists should stop talking about images as being 
mental pictures, and begin viewing them as mental layouts. 
However, Neisser (1972) does not, as does Gibson, discount 
higher order processes in the representation of the en-
vironment, constructed on the basis of available cues. 
Like Pylyshyn (1973), Neisser (1972) feels that intro-
spection, a technique still used to study imagery, is 
laden with problems and has aided in perpetuating the view 
of the visual image being a mental picture. It is claimed 
that the emphasis in present day cognitive psychology, an 
approach emphasizing mental processes, has changed the 
conception of the brain from that of a storehouse to that 
of an organ with various functions, which in turn neces-
sitates a change in the views of what imagery is. Im-
agery now becomes, not mental contents awaiting descrip-
tion, but a form of mental activity which is immensely 
complex, involving rapid changes and a myriad of inter-
relations in the brain. Because of this inferred com-
plexity, Neisser (1972) contends that what is reported 
through introspection is somewhat arbitrary, even if it 
is assumed that all processes are, in some sense, avail-
able to the· subject. Because of the problems arising 
with introspection, psychologists turned to behaviorism, 
which., ignored, or flatly denied many of the character-
istics of human beings, which, in fact, sets them apart 
from other living organisms. However, in the last few 
years, a paradigm shift h~s occured, placing emphasis on 
how information is processed. At present, concepts like 
rehearsal, mnemonic strategy, encoding, and imagery are 
the items of interest, as opposed to the behaviorist's 
emphasis on stimulis variables. Of these mnemonic strat-
egies and processes that have been recently investigated, 
none has been studied more than imagery, judging from 
reported research over the past several years. Such studies 
have indicated the importance of an individual's mental 
activities in relation to his performance, while indica-
ting that the most powerful of such activities may well 
be visual representation. The realization that visual 
representation is an effective mnemonic device is viewed 
(Neisser, 1972) as creating opportunities as well as 
dangers. The danger spoken of is that of oversimplifi-
cation, with respect to imagery •.. That is to say, imagery 
has been characterized as having a single set of proper-
ties quite distinct from those of verbal processes. The 
feeling (Neisser, 1972) seems to be that such a conception 
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is misleading, in that, while imagery may have some unique 
properties, it may also have properties in common with 
other forms of mental representation. Other indications 
of an oversimplified view of imagery processes are apparent 
if one considers some questions, with respect to imagery, 
that have not been asked (Neisser, 1972). Among such 
questions are: does imagery differ among children and 
adults; may there be more than one kind of imagery; and 
how might the various types of imagery interact to enhance 
or detract from performance, in contrast to performance 
dependent upon only one form of imagery? Then too, studies 
involving investigation of individual differences in im-
agery ability have revealed that inter as well as intra-
individual variation may be quite marked, suggesting that 
imagery may be a more complex process than is now thought. 
Neisser (1972) points out that the view that the 
brain is an organ whose function is to process information, 
necessitates that the information reaching it through the 
sense organs must be analyzed, abstracted, coded and re-
worked, in such a manner so as to preserve critical infor-
' 
mation, while not overloading it. It is contended that 
imagery, while it might be visual, in some sense, need 
not be pictorial. That is to say, if imagery involves 
the picking up of spatial information about the environ-
ment, as opposed to merely copying it, subjects should 
be able to imagine layouts which could not be pictured 
(e.g. a situation in which an object is in front of, or 
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concealed by another object). 
Neisser & Kerr (1973) have reported some results 
which point to the notion that images may, in fact, be 
spatial, while not necessarily being pictorial. Subjects 
were asked to imagine a variety of spatial situations 
(pictorial-interacting; pictorial-separate; and finally, 
"concealed images"). After subjects imagined each scene, 
they were then asked to rate that image for its vividness. 
Following this, subjects were asked to recall the scene, 
given a cue from the sentence which described it. It 
was predicted that the pictorial and concealed conditions 
should result in equally good recall, and that the recall 
for the "separate" image condition should be inferior to 
both. Finally, rated vividness of pic:torial images should 
be higher than the rated vividness of the concealed images, 
on the assumption that ratings would be based on the sub-
ject's expectancies of what images were, rather than on 
well defined aspects of their mental processes. The pre-
dications were confirmed, with regard to recall: the 
pictorial-interactive and concealed conditions did not 
differ from one another, but both were significantly 
greater than the pictorial separate condition. The pre-
dictions with regard to vividness ratings, however, were 
not confirmed. The pictorial-separate and concealed con-
dition ratings did not differ significantly, while the 
interactive ratings were significantly higher than either 
the pictorial-separate or the concealed condition ratings. 
Neisser & Kerr (1973) interpreted the resuJ,.ts as indica-
ting that images need not be pictorial in r..ature, and 
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that the result is consistant with notions as to the nature 
of imagery as presented by Neisser (1972). Namely, im-
aging is a constructive process which is actively related 
to perceiving, and further, that imagery is not simply 
the examination of a simple mental picture, but rather, 
involves information pickup about the layout of the envir-
onment. 
To summarize Neisser's (1972) position: imagery is 
viewed as occurring whenever an individual employs some 
of the same cognitive processes that would be used in 
perceiving, but that such processes need not be accompanied 
by introspective report of picture-like me'ntal contents, 
or the stimulis input that would normally give rise to such 
perception. Imagery is viewed as a constructive process, 
in that, while it depends on information stored earlier, 
it does not simply revive that information. Instead, the 
subject carries out a new activity, perhaps forming a 
new representation, more or less consistant with what he 
had seen before. 
More recently, another investigator has questioned 
the classical and most prevalent view of the nature of 
imagery. Much like Neisser (1972), Pylyshyn (1973) has 
attacked the generally accepted notion that the image is 
pictorial in nature. It is argued, much like the views of 
Neisser (1972), that the fact that introspective reports 
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on the use of imagery (in its common sense) do not neces-
sarily point to imagery being a pictorial representation, 
even though such reports usually indicate picture-like 
phenomenon. The argument is, just because it is reported 
that we say things to ourselves, or "see" objects in our 
mind's eye, it cannot be assumed that such activities are 
the actual information processing procedures taking place. 
Pylyshyn (1973) attacks the assumption, abounding in 
research, that what is functional is available to intro-
spection, arguing that just because our memory for cog-
nitive events appears limited to sensory-motor images, 
this does not mean that these are the processes which are 
operative. Pylyshyn (1973) states that the above assump-
tion appears to have led most psychologists to the feeling 
that there are no forms of mental repres13ntation other than 
words or images. Additionally, Pylyshyn (1973) feels, as 
does Neisser (1972), that some mental representatibns 
may be such that they are not amenable to observation from 
within or without. The fact that humans have the ability 
to transform mental pictures into mental words, and vice-
versa, indicates that there must be a form of mental 
representation which encompasses both mental words and 
mental pictures. Further, it is contended that such an 
encompassing mental representation must necessarily be more 
abstract and not consciously available. Pylyshyn (1973) 
feels, to assume that mental words and images are linked 
by direct associative connections is untenable, in that 
words are generic while images are specific. Based on 
this assumption, it is thought that an infinite number of 
links would have to be formed for a given word, and each 
possible instance of the concept. However, there are those 
(Paivio, 1971a) who contend that an image need not neces-
sarily be specific. In line with this contention, 
Paivio (1971a) states that images may, in fact, be sche-
matic forms of representation, with the specificity of the 
image being derived from the ongoing situation. This latter 
conception of the image (Paivio, 1971a) appears to be 
consistant with Neisser's (1972) views as to the nature of 
visual imagery. To Pylyshyn's (1973) thinking, the image 
must necessarily be something other than visual. Basic-
ally, the contention seems to be that some sort of pic-
torial representation may be aroused, but not directly. 
Rather, what is commonly referred to as an image, is de-
rived from a person's knowledge stored in the form of pre-
positional statements of some uncharacterizable nature. 
Pylyshyn (1973) agrees with Atwood (1971), that the 
most elementary question that be asked about mnemonic vis-
ualizations is the following: does the mnemonic image 
actually involve the visual system? Atwood (1971), using 
the method of selective interference concludes that it 
does. Pylyshyn (1973) feels that wh.ile this conclusion may 
be sound from a phenomenological standpoint, it is un-
satisfactory as an explanation of how information is re-
trieved from memory, for several reasons. First, the 
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storage of sensory material in a "raw" state would endow 
the brain with an incredible storage capacity. Secondly, 
such a position would imply that retrieval would take 
place by either some sort of scanning process, or through 
some system whereby images are retrieved by use of gross 
labels, tagging each image. The first of the suggested 
retrieval systems is· seen as untenable, in that exhaustive 
search would be too slow a process. Also, Pylyshyn (1973) 
contends that introspective reports do not indicate that 
information is retrieved only after a series of false 
starts. This latter objection seems somewhat strange, in 
that Pylyshyn (1973), in presenting his arguments, has 
stated that introspective experience need not actually 
reflect the actual ongoing processes. The second possi-
bility, that of retreival via a "tagging" mechanisms, is 
dismissed on the grounds that retrieval of images appears 
to be hierarchical. Here again, it appears that Pylyshyn 
(1973) is again appealing to introspection; a technique 
he has critisized, to make his point. The question, for 
Pylyshyn (1973), then becomes, if visual images are not 
pictorial representations, what are they?' For Pylyshyn 
(1973) the answer seems to be that they are descriptions of 
scenes, rather than pictures of them. That is to say, 
images are not photograph-like, thereby being amenable to 
perceptual analysis. Rather, images are products of sen-
sory datum which has been perceptually analyzed and stored 
in some form (e.g. propositions, data structures or pro-
83 
cedures). 
While both Neisser (1972) and Pylyshyn (1973) have 
taken issue with the classical notion of imagery being 
nothing more than mental pictures, both seem to admit that 
the process known as imagery does involve, in some way, 
spatial relations. Neisser (1972), it seems, has taken 
the position that images, while not being pictorial, are 
some sort of visual representation (layouts of the en-
vironment). Pylyshyn (1973), on the other hand, main-
tains that imagery is essentially propositional in nature, 
but that it can give rise to some sort of visual repre-
sentation. The concession that imagery may be something 
other than visual in nature, that imaginal processes can 
give rise to some fo!'m of spatial representation, seems 
necessary in light of existing empirical evidence. The 
existing empirical evidence referred to are those studies 
employing the technique of selective interference (Atwood, 
1971). 
One such study (Wegmann & Weber, 1973) had subjects 
imagine block capital letters being traced out in a matrix, 
by means of a series of cell names (cells of the matrix). 
One half of the subjects were presented the cell moves 
auditorially, while the remaining half of the subjects 
read the same cell moves from index cards. Results in-
dicated that the performance, in terms of percent of 
letters correctly identified, was significantly greater for 
the subjects receiving auditory presentation, relative to 
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those subjects receiving visual presentation of the to-be-
processed material. The data was interpreted (Wegmann & 
Weber, 1973) as indicating.that visual presentation, in 
some fashion, overloaded the visual system, such that 
capacity for imagery was reduced. 
Other evidence that imagery is, in some sense, visual 
comes from a study by Kosslyn (1973). It was argued that 
if images are spatial representations of their referents, 
several testable hypotheses are possible. One, subjects 
should be able to focus selectively on part of an image. 
Two, time would be required to shift from one part of the 
image to another. Finally, the farther a given property· 
is from another property in an image, the longer the shift 
of attention from one to the other should take. According-
ly, subjects were shown pictures under imaginal or ver-
bal encoding instructions. Additionally, each instruction 
group was told to either focus their attention on a spec-
ific portion of the image or the verbally encoded material, 
or to maintain an overall idea of the material. Subjects 
were then asked questions about the pictures with re-
sponse latencies taken. Results indicated that for the 
focus groups, response latencies were a linear function of 
the distance of the probed item from the subject's focus, 
with the verbalization group having longer response lat-
encies, on the average, than the imagery group. Functions 
for whole imagers and verbalizers were essentially flat, 
with the verbal group again having longer response laten-
cies. Also, the positive slope of the function for the 
verbal focus group was considerably greater than the slope 
for the image focus group. This latter result was inter-
preted as indicating that subjects in the image group were 
able to employ some parallel processing as opposed to the 
verbal group. Additionally, the fact that the functions of 
the whole groups were essentially flat, with the verbal 
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function above that of the image group suggests that the 
verbal group had to transform material encoded verbally to 
a pictorial representation prior to making their response. 
In light of the arguments presented by Neisser (1972) and 
Pylyshyn (1973), and the empirical evidence cited, it 
seems that imagery does have spatial properties, be they 
directly or indirectly aroused. 
Another aspect of imagery reseaFch that has seemingly 
received a great deal of attention in the past has been 
with regard to the function of imagery, rather than with 
respect to its nature. ;.One of the most active investi-
gators in the area of imagery research has been Allan 
Paivio. Initially, Paivio's work centered around the 
function of imagery within standard verbal learning sit-
uations. More recently, however, Paivio has begun to 
look at the findings of his researches in terms of the 
functional distinction between imagery and verbal processes. 
This more general approach has led Paivio to view verbal 
and imaginal processes as alternative memory coding systems, 
and to consider the functional significance of imagery for 
a general theory of memory. Paivio (1972a) points out 
that the imagery value of stimuli has been shown to be an 
effective variable in paired associate learning, verbal 
discrimination learning, free recall, serial learning, 
86 
and the Brown-Peterson paradigm. He rejects both motiva-
tional and verbal interpretations of the effect of imagery. 
The former interpretation is rejected in that imagery 
effects remain undiminished in incidental learning situ-
ations. The. verbal interpretation of imagery effects is 
rejected in that, the effects of meaningfulness and fre-
quency are weaker than the effects of concreteness, in 
addition to having effects which sometimes run contrary 
to the effects of concreteness. 
Paivio's (1972a) observations as to the differences 
between imagery and verbal processes have led him to 
propose a two-process theory of memory. This two-process 
approach states that the ease of image generation is a 
function of item concreteness, while verbal coding or media-
tion would be independent of concreteness~ and instead, re-
lated to associative meaningfulness. Reaction time data 
support the contention. The hypothesis implied that part 
of the imagery effect can be attributed to the ease of 
image discovery. Findings indicate that it takes longer 
to generate images to abstract versus concrete nouns. For 
verbal mediators, however, it has been shown that asso-
ciative latencies do not vary as a function of concreteness. 
It has been suggested that the sometime superiority of 
87 
imagery mnemonics cannot be explained solely by encoding 
factors. This is due to the fact that evidence (Paivio & 
Foth, 1970) has been reported, indicating that imaginal 
encoding was superior to verbal encoding for concrete noun 
pairs, even though the verbal and imaginal mediators were 
discovered equally quickly. Therefore, ease of encoding 
does not provide an adequate explanation of the frequently 
reported superiority of imaginal over verbal encoding. 
Further, encoding instructions appear to be "overridden 
by the meaning attributes of stimuli, with imagery being 
the preferred strategy, when at least one member of a 
word pair is rated high in imagery value. In contrast, 
only verbal mediators are available for abstract pairs. 
Therefore, both visual and verbal encoding processes are 
implicated in the effects of concreteness and imagery 
mnemonic instructions on performance. 
Wicker and Holley (1971) reported some results 
which seem consistent with a dual coding position. Sub-
jects learned mixed paired associate lists, with imagery or 
no encoding instructions. Lists consisted of 15 word-
word pairs, each pair having auditory, visual or no dis-
tractor type. Results indicated that visual distraction 
pairs had a greater negative effect with pictorial versus 
verbal stimuli. In contrast, auditory distraction had 
an equal negative effect on the recall of either picture-
word or word-word pairs. It was concluded, (Wicker & 
Holley, 1971) that the results were consistant with a dual 
encoding hypothesis, while indicating the greater use 
of imagery mediation for pictorial stimuli. 
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Also, Paivio and Csapo (1971) showed lists of con-
crete words, abstract words, and pictures at a fast rate 
(5.3 items per sec.) or at a slow rate (2 items per sec.). 
It was expected that recall would differ, at the fast 
rate, for the different types of stimuli, in that the sub-
jects would not be able to encode items verbally. On the 
other hand, the slower rate of presentation should result 
in smaller recall differences, in that all stimuli types 
would be verbally encoded. Results for the fast rate of 
presentation indicated the typical finding for sequential 
memory tasks: concrete words were recalled best, followed 
by abstract words and then pictures. At the slow rate of 
presentation however, there were no significant differ-
ences for recall of concrete words, abstract words, and 
pictures. It was assumed that both the vis'µal and verbal 
codes were available for concrete words and pictures, but 
differentially so. It takes more time to label a pic-
ture than to read a word. Therefore, at the fast rate of 
presentation, the verbal code was less available for pic-
tures. The verbal code, on the other hand, is the only 
code available for abstract words. It was concluded (Paivio 
& Csapo, 1971) that the results provided support for a 
dual coding position for memory. 
A further test of the dual-encoding hypothesis was 
conducted by Paivio and Csapo (1973), in a series of five 
experiments. In experiment I, subjects learned lists of 
pictures and words -under intentional learning, incidental 
learning, or free recall instructions. The orienting 
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task required subjects to write down the word presented, 
or a word labelling the picture presented. The nature of 
the orienting task, it was reasoned, would insure verbal 
encoding. A significant stimuli by conditions inter-
action revealed that performance for free recall, int,en-
tional and incidential groups was about equal. However, 
for concrete versus abstract word recall, the free recall 
group recalled the most words, followed by the intentional 
and incidental groups respectively. These results were 
interpreted as indicating that, for pictures, the or-
ienting task insured that both visual and verbal codes 
were aroused, and hence, resulted in similar performance 
for each group. In the case of word stimuli, however, the 
orienting task drew attention, primarily, to the verbal 
code, and differences in recall performance for the 
groups appear, with free recall being the best and inci""' 
dental learning the worst. In sum, the results (Paivio & 
Csapo, 1973) of experiment I were interpreted as being 
consistant with a dual coding position, while not ruling 
out o~her possibilities. 
In experiment II (Paivio & Csapo, 1973) all subjects 
were given an incidental learning task. Groups of sub-
jects were required to learn items (pictures or words) 
under one of two orienting tasks (drawing the item versus 
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verbally labelling the item). It was predicted that per-
formance for the picture-label and word-draw conditions 
should be superior to picture-draw or word-label conditions 
(if a dual encoding notion holds)~ It was found that for 
picture stimuli, the orienting task made no difference 
on performance, while for word stimuli, the performance 
of the word-draw group was markedly superior to that of 
the word-label group. 
A third experiment (Paivio & Csapo, 1973) was con-
ducted, the conditions being the same as those of experi-
ment II, with the exception that subjects were told, 
explicitly, to form visual and/or verbal codes to the 
stimuli. Results of experiment III were similar to that 
of experiment II. In summary, the results of experiments 
II and III (Paivio & Csapo, 1973) indicate that dual 
coding of pictures or words was not superior to imaginal 
coding of pictures. This suggests that a concrete image 
may account for the superior recall of picture stimuli, as 
well as imaginally versus verbally encoded words. The 
latter result also attests to the potency of mental imagery 
as a mnemonic strategy. 
In conclusion, the results of experiments I-III 
appear consistant with an image superiority hypothesis, 
or some synthesis of an image superiority hypothesis and 
dual coding hypothesis. The results of experiments IV 
and V (Paivio & Csapo, 1973) indicated that pictures were 
recalled better than words and that repetitions could en-
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hance recall. Also, the evidence indicated that the two 
codes were independent and additive. Generally, the re-
sults of the five experiments (Paivio & Csapo, 1973) 
indicated that the superiority of pictures versus word 
recall can be explained by a dual coding hypothesis, with 
imaginal encoding yielding a relatively greater contri-
bution to performance. Two possible classes of explana-
tions were offered. First, the superiority of pictures 
may be due to the fact that "inter-item" associations 
among words may be interfering. Alternatively, organ-
ization could be a factor. It could be the case that pic-
tures lead to more efficient organization and chunking, 
and therefore, less memory load. Most important, however, 
the results (Paivio & Csapo, 1973) were interpreted as 
providing support for two major systems of memory and cog-
nition, that are independent and yet functionally related. 
Additional support for the existance of visual and 
verbal systems comes from a study by Murray and Newman 
(1973). Subjects were shown matrices containing a square, 
circle and triangl'.e, which they had to reproduce in a blank 
matrix, after different retention intervals, filled by 
different interference tasks. It was found that recall 
performance de.c·reased as interference went from verbal 
interference to visual interference to visual plus audi-
tory interference. 
Also, a study by Elliott (1973) provides additional 
evidence for both visual .and verbal encoding of information, 
by demonstrating selective interference effects. Subjects 
were shown triads of either high or low imagery words 
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after which they engaged in one of several interpolated 
tasks (no interpolated activity, Peterson-Peterson- task-
auditory interference, or reproduction of geometric figures-
visual interference) while using rote or imaginal mnemonics 
in remembering the items in the triads. The results in-
dicated that the imagery set resulted in better recall, 
relative to the repetition set. However, facilitation by 
the imagery set was greater for high versus low imagery 
words. It was also found that the number task caused more 
interference in the repetition condition, while the visual 
imagery condition was most greatly affected by the visual 
language task. It was concluded (Elliott, 1973) that the 
results indicated distinct visual and auditory-mot9r 
storage systems in memory. Numerous other studies have 
also presented findings consistant with a dual coding 
hypothesis (Atwood, 1971; Weber & Kelley, 1972; Weber, 
Kelley & Little, 1972; Seamon, 1972; Nelson & Brooks, 1973; 
Hall, Swane & Jenkins, 1973; Mondani & Batting, 1973; Segal 
& Fusella, 1971; Siegal & Allik, 1973; Horwitz & Levin, 
1972). 
On the basis of the above discussion, it would 
appear that the recall superiority of pictures over con-
crete nouns over abstract nouns may be due, in part to 
organizational processes based on imagery. In line with 
this thinking, several investigators have obtained re-
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sults that indicate the importance of figural unity or inte-
gration of the mediating image. Bolt (1971) reported, in 
a series of three experiments that subjects were able to 
recall more cues for organized versus unorganized pictures. 
Additionally, Morris and Reid (1971) reported that, in a 
paired associate task, noun imagery facilitated recall, 
only when the word pair was compatible (e.g. such that an 
image of the two items of the pair could be easily formed). 
Therefore, figural organization·may be the basis for the 
observed superiority of imagery mnemonics over verbal med-
iation, for dealing with concrete nouns. If the S-R 
association is stored as a compound image, and the image 
is reinstated, it can be quickly scanned to'produce the 
appropriate response. On the other hand, verbal medi-
ators must be stored with the appropriate stimuli and re-
sponses, as a string of words (this may result in a greater 
memory load and/or longer search time, and therefore, less 
efficient retrieval). 
Griffith and Johnston (1973) had subjects engage in 
a paired associate learning reaction time task, concur-
rently, under imaginal or rote instructions. Results 
indicated that imagery instructions resulted in better 
recall, relative to rote instructions, as did the recall 
of high imagery items, relative to low imagery items. 
Also, extra pair confusion was less for the imagery set, 
only on study trials, while being less for high versus low 
imagery items.during recall. Therefore, it appears that 
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imagery set and imagery value, while affecting recall in 
a similar way, had affected different phases of the task. 
On the basis of the findings, Griffith and Johnston (1973) 
hypothesized that imagery set may have affected encoding, 
while the imagery value of items might have made responses 
more "functionally" available. 
Also, it seems possible that the facilatory effects 
of imagery may be due to differential intreverbal inter-
ference. In this context, it has been thought that 
instructions to form bizzare images could reduce inter-
ference while increasing distinctiveness. However, re-
search on bizzareness has been conflicting, although recent 
investigations would appear to indicate that the bizzare-
ness of images does not aid in reducing interference or 
serves to make images more distinct. Collyer, Jonides and 
Bevan (1972) had subjects recall a noun-verb-noun triplet, 
under imagery instructions (bizzare versus common). Re-
sults indicated that the common instruction and the imagery 
instruction resulted in better recall. It was hypothesized 
that formation of a common image would provide the sub-
ject with a greater probability for recall. 
Another study (Wollen, Weber & Lowry, 1972) sought 
to investigate the effects of interaction and bizzareness 
of mental images, and their effects on recall. Subjects 
engaged in a picture paired associate task, in which the 
pictures were bizzare or common and interacting or non-
interacting. Results indicated that interacting pictures 
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resulted in better recall, but that bizzareness had no 
effect. It was suggested (Wollen, Weber & Lowry, 1972) 
that previous research, indicating the efiectiveness of 
bizzareness, may have confounded bizzareness and the inter-
action of images. 
A subsequent study (Nappe & Wollen, 1973) using cued 
paired associate recall, again indicated that bizzareness 
did not result in better recall. However, it has been 
reported by numerous investigators, that interaction of 
stimulis-response items (imaginal or pictorial) does have 
a facilitating effect on recall. Wollen and Lowry (1971) 
reported a facilitation of recall for noun-noun pairs 
when accompanied by pictures which depicted the pair 
items interacting, but no such facilitation when the pair 
items shown in the pictures were not interacting, or when 
the items appeared in separate pictures. It was suggested 
(Wollen & Lowry, 1971) that interacting pictures facili-
tated associative encoding of the stimulis and response 
items. 
Bower and Reitman (1972) had subjects learn five 
successive lists of 20 words, under separate images (peg-
word method), elaboration of images (peg-word method), 
or by the method of loci instructions. Generally, it was 
found that recall was poorer for the separate images con-
dition. This was interpreted as implying that, as the 
number of contexts increases, recall decreases and that 
interacting images have a facilitory effect on recall. 
Lesgold and Goldman (1973), however, reported some re-
sults which appear to conflict with the results reported 
by Bower and Reitman (1972). Subjects generated inter-
active images to triplets of concrete nouns, under common 
instance or pair specific instructions. Results indicated 
that as the number of contests increased, the recognition 
percentage increased. Similar results were observed in 
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a subsequent experiment, which required recall rather than 
recognition. While the results of the Bower and Reitman 
(1972) study appear to be at odds with results obtained 
by Lesgold and Goldman (1973), it should be noted, that 
the tasks in the two studies are somewhat discrepant. In 
line with this it has been suggested that different tasks 
may call forth different types of imagery strategies. 
The role of imagery in learning and memory is both 
conceptually and empirically clearest in associative re-
trieval. The conceptual-peg hypothesis of paired associate 
learning is essentially a retrieval theory. The theory 
views the function of the stimulis term as being that of 
a peg to which the response is "hooked", and the more solid 
the peg, the better the recall. The theory assumes that 
the ease of image mediated association is related to the 
concreteness of the to-be-associated events, and in partic-
ular, to the concreteness of the retrieval cue. Further, 
it is assumed that the concreteness of both the stimulus 
and response items are equally important during storage, 
but that it is the concreteness of the stimulis item that 
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is most important during retrieval. 
Jacobus, Leonard and Stratton (1971) investigated 
the effects of imagery in the paired associate learning of 
adjectives. In two experiments (the first using unmixed 
lists-with r~gard to imagery and the second using mixed 
lists) using a paired associate task, it was found that for 
unmixed lists, results were similar to those found for 
the paired associate learning of nouns, but indicated that 
response imagery tended to be more effective than stim-
ulus imagery. These differences suggest that imagery may 
have different effects for adjectives as opposed to nouns. 
However, some results, discrepant from those just dis-
cussed had been previously reported by Di Vesta and Ross 
(1971). Subjects differing in imagery·ability, as measured 
by spatial reasoning tests, learned paired associate 
lists of noun-adjective or adjective-noun pairs. The 
findings (Di Vesta & Ross, 1971) showed noun-adjective 
recall to be superior to adjective-noun recall, and also, 
that with regard to the response position, noun imagery 
was more critical than adjective imagery. Further, the 
results indicated that the effects of imagery on stimulus 
items, relative to response items, was more important for 
the former, regardless of whether the stimulus item was 
an adjective or a noun. The resu+ts (Di Vesta & Ross, 1971) 
were interpreted as indicating that the imagery value of 
nouns is more closely linked to paired-associate learning 
than the imagery value of adjectives, and that stimulus 
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imagery is more important than response imagery. 
The peg hypothesis also implies that, in free recall, 
members of a pair should be equally well recalled. This 
has been confirmed by Yarmey and Ure (1971). Also, there 
should be no differential effect of concreteness in a 
matching test, in that, either member of the pair could 
function as the retrieval cue. This latter prediction has 
been confirmed by Paivio and Rowe (1971). While on the 
basis of the above findings, the conceptual-peg hypothesis 
seems plausible, the evidence does not conclusively point 
to imagery mediation. Explanations could be made in terms 
of stimulus differentiation or recognition, rather than 
association. However, reported results from several re-
cent studies would appear to strengthen the mediation 
position. Bower (1971) found recall to be better for sub-
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jects asked to imagine items of noun pairs as inter-
acting with one another, as opposed to imaging each item 
seperately. '. Further, the relationship held, even when 
only recognized stimuli were considered. Additionally, 
Rowe and Paivio (1971) found that instructions to image only 
to the correct member of a noun pair, versus imaging 
to both members (with the correct member imagined as being 
larger), enhanced recall. However, in an unexpected asso-
ciative recall task which followed, the group imaging to 
both items of a pair displayed superior recall. Results 
were interpreted (Rowe & Paivio, 1971) as indicating that 
imagery can facilitate both verbal discrimination as well 
as associative learning, with the type of imagery that is 
effective, differing markedly for the two tasks. 
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Other sources of evidence for an imagery interpre-
tation of the effects of imagery come from results reported 
by Phillipchalk and Paivio (1971) and Paivio and Okovita 
(1971). In the former study, subjects learned to associate 
nonsense syllables to either pictures, concrete or ab-
stract nouns. The syllables were then used as stimuli 
for a subsequent paired-associate learning task, with the 
subjects told to use associations from the first phase of 
the study as mediators, or with subjects given no instruc-
tions at all. It was found that paired-associate learning, 
for the group receiving mediation instructions, was best 
for those that had associated the nonsense syllables to 
pictures, then concrete words, and finally abstract words. 
Such dffferences were not found for the no mediation in-· 
struction group. The results were interpreted as in-
dicating support for an imagery interpretation of con-
creteness effects. Paivio and Okovita (1971) found that 
congenitally blind subjects learned high auditory imagery 
words better than low auditory imagery words (even when 
the latter were high in visual imagery). In contrast, 
sighted subjects benefited from visual, but not auditory 
word imagery. The finding that sighted subjects were 
able to benefit from visual word imagery, but not from 
auditory word imagery is somewhat mysterious, and de-
serves further investigation. At any rate, Paivio and 
Okovita (1971) interpreted their findings as indicating 
that learning was mediated by modality specific images. 
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The .effects of imagery in verbal discrimination 
learning has also been investigated, in a series of studies 
by Allen Paivio and E. J. Rowe. In the first of the 
studies Rowe and Paivio (1971a) the effects of imagery 
versus repetition instructions was studied. Subjects 
were shown pairs of high imagery, high frequency words 
(the correct one underlined) with instructions to: form 
a single image to the correct item; form a :compound 
image of the word pairs; or to repeat the correct item 
verbally; or no instruc·tions. Subjects were then supplied 
lists of the correct or incorrect items and asked to 
supply the other word of the pair. Results indicated 
that both imagery conditions proved to be effective 
mnemonics, but that forming a single image was most effec-
tive. For associative learning, formation of a compound 
image was most effective. Further, it was found that the 
compound image condition was less affected by the cue in 
associative learning. This latter result would suggest 
that the imagery effect is in the associative phase of 
paired associate learning. 
A second study (Rowe & Paivio, 1971b) consisted of 
a series of four experiments in whi:ch the frequency and 
imagery value of words were factorially varied over two 
levels. In summary, the results indicated that high im-
agery noun pairs were significantly easier to learn than 
101 
low imagery noun pairs, for both mixed and unmixed lists. 
This result was limited to high frequency words in two of 
the four experiments. Also, in two of the. experiments, 
high frequency words were easier to learn (limited to low 
imagery word pairs in mixed lists). Additionally, the 
second experiment indicated that the imagery strategy 
was preferred for high imagery word pairs, while the re-
petition strategy was preferred for low imagery word pairs. 
It was concluded (Rowe & Paivio, 197lb) that imagery had 
a strong effect in all cases, while frequency showed an 
effect for a restricted range of frequency values, in 
mixed list design. Moreover, when frequency had a sig-
nificant effect, it was restricted to low imagery pairs. 
In summary, it was concluded (Rowe & Paivio, 1971b) that 
frequency, as indexed by Thorndike-Lorge is ineffective 
in verbal discrimination learning. 
Rowe & Paivio (1972) studied the effects of noun 
imagery, pronounciation, method of presentation and intra-
pair order of items in verbal discrimination learning. 
The study represented an attempt to examine the generality 
of the imagery effect in verbal discrimination learning. 
Subjects were shown pairs of high and low imagery words 
under combinations of several conditions: study-test 
versus anticipation; pronounciation of list pairs; and 
constant or varied order of pair members. Results indi-
cated that high imagery word pairs were easier to dis-
criminate than low imagery word pairs, and that learning 
was facilitated when pronounciation was not required. 
Additionally, the method of presentation (study-test 
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versus anticipation), and constant or varied intrapair 
ordering were relatively unimportant. This latter result 
was interpreted .(Rowe & Paivio, 1972) as indicating that 
the explanation of imagery effects in verbal discrimination 
learning is to be found in the different characteristics 
of high and low imagery words, rather than in methodo-
logies used. 
Paivio and Rowe(l971) conducted a study aimed at 
dealing with the findings of Rowe and Paivio (197lb), 
where it was reported that while high imagery word pairs 
led to better discrimination, meaning and frequency were, 
by in large, ineffective. Two explanations have been 
offered for the above finding. First, it could be that 
high imagery word pairs evoke more implicit associative 
responses (images) and differential image arousal would be 
responsible for the effect. This explanation would pre-
dict that verbal discrimination learning would be best 
for heterogeneous word pairs, with the high imagery item 
being the correct one. As an alternative, a S might "tag" 
an item as being right or wrong (relational interpreta.:.. 
tion). In this instance, it would be predicted that 
verbal discrimination learning should be best for homo-
geneous high imagery pairs. Results indicated that the 
only significant effect was that low imagery, homogeneous 
pairs were more difficult to discriminate. Therefore, 
the data appear inc6nsistant with eith~r an associative, 
or a relational interpretation of verbal discrimination 
learning. 
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Rowe (1972) investigated imagery and repetition 
effects in verbal discrimination learning as a function of 
lag. It was argued that if imagery and frequency are truly 
independent variables in verbal discrimination learning, 
there should be differential effects of lag for the two 
variables. Subjects were presented two, 48 pair lists of 
high imagery words. On the first prese~tation, a pair 
appeared with the correct item being underlined, at lags 
of O, 8, 16, 32, or 64 intervening items. Subjects were 
given instructions to: form an image to the item; verbal-
ly repeat the item; or were given no instructions at all. 
The results indicated that recall for the imagery group 
was superior to recall for the repetition group, which 
in turn was superior to the recall for the no instruction 
group. The main effect of lag was also significant, in-
dicating that recall decreased, as lag increased. The 
effect of repetition on recall was interpreted as support-
ing frequency theory, while the overall superiority of the 
imagery group supports the contention of Paivio and Rowe 
(1971) that imagery instructions are more effective than 
repetition instructions in verbal discrimination learning. 
While the focus of the research reviewed in the pre-
sent paper has been primarily on the intentional use of 
imagery as an information processing strategy, still 
104 
another area of investigation involving im~ginal processes, 
,· 
has been in the area of incidental learnint. An early in-
vestigation by Betts (1909) led to the conclusion that con-
fusion in subjects increases the amount of reported imagery. 
The finding was later confirmed by the results of researches 
of Fox (1914) and Comstock (1921). Sheehan (1972) contends 
that the function of visual imagery in unexpected recall 
is an important area of study, in that much of the learn-
ing we engage in, is in situations where the demand for 
memory i's unexpected. 
Bower (1972) investigated whether the superior learn-
ing for imaginal instructions was dependent upon the sub-
ject's intention to learn. Subjects were given intent-
ional or incidental learning instructions, with all sub-
jects given an imagery orienting set at item inspection. 
Results (Bower, 1972) indicated similar levels of perfor-
mance for the intentional and incidental groups, indica-
ting that imagery instructions for the incidental group 
were quite sufficient to break down the typically reported 
inferiority of incid'ental learning, in comparison to 
intentional learning. Also, Yuille (1971) found that imag-
ery (as defined by stimulis concreteness) was an influ-
ential factor in incidental learning. It was found, 
recall was better for concrete noun-digit pairs versus 
abstract noun-digit pairs, even though the subjects had 
been asked to name them, rather than learn them. 
Ya:rmey· and Ure (1971) investigated the effects of 
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incidental learning, noun imagery, and direction of asso-
ciations in paired-associate learning. Subjects were given 
one of four rating tasks on which to rate C-C, C-A, and 
A-A word pairs. Half the subjects were given intentional 
learning instructions and half were not. Following the 
inspection of word pairs, subjects in both the intentional 
and incidental groups were first given a free recall test, 
followed by a cued recall test. Results indicated that 
intentional recall was superior to incidental recall and 
that C-C pairs were recalled significantly better than the 
other pair types. Additionally, recall did not differ 
for C-A versus A-C pairs, and both C-A as well as A-C 
pairs were recalled significantly better than A-A pairs. 
Further, the effects of the direction of association was 
not significant, while being in the expected direction. 
It was concluded, (Yarmey & Ure, 1971), that intentional 
learning was quantitively better, but qualitatively similar 
to incidental learning. 
It has been established that instructions to learn, 
which prompt clear expectation of recall, produce approp-
riate "representational responses" or "differential re-
sponses" during the inspection of the material to be 
learned. Further, it seems that a similar situation ex-
ists with respect to incidental learning, but to a lesser 
degree. Preexperimental habits which a subject may bring 
to a learning situation are many and varied. Included 
may be associative responses to inspection items, grouping 
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and classification habits, imagery evocation, and selec-
tive reactions to various features of the inspection items. 
The amount of intentional or incidental learning which 
takes place is thought to depend on the representational 
responses brought to the experimental situation and on 
those representational responses aroused by the experimental 
situation. When recall occurs, it is these responses 
which must serve to facilitate memory. Further, it is 
thought that the responses occurring in the intentional 
versus the incidental situations may be different with 
respect to degree, rather than kind. 
In line with this analysis, Sheehan (1972a) has 
hypothesized that the difference in amount recalled by 
intentional versus incidental learners will be a function 
of the imagery arousing value of the items in an inspec-
tion list. It was reasoned that, since imagery evocation 
occurs more readily for high imagery versus low imagery 
words, such responses should occur equally for intentional 
and incidental learners, for high imagery words. However, 
abstract words, not giving rise to imagery, should be 
easier to learn for intentional subjects, in that being 
motivated to learn the inspection items, they should pro- . 
duce additional non-imaginal representational responses. 
In summary, the hypothesis advanced by Sheehan (1972a) 
is as follows: the difference in recall for incidental 
versus intentional learning should be a function of the 
imagery value of the inspection items, the smaller the 
difference in recall between incidental and intentional 
learners. 
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In a test of the above hypothesis, Sheehan (1971a) 
used independent sets of subjects, that were given either 
incidental or intentional instruction in factorial com-
bination with orienting task instructions to rate the in-
spection items for either, imagery value or familiarity. 
Inspection items consisted of both concrete and abstract 
nouns. Following the presentation of the inspection lists, 
a free recall test was administered followed by a recog-
nition test and inquiry into the use of imagery mnemonics. 
It was predicted that, if imagery has functional signi-
ficance in incidental learning, the difference in retention 
of the abstract and concrete words would be greater in 
incidental than in intentional learning. Results indica-
ted that the hypothesis was supported only for the recog-
nition test under the familiarity orienting set. It was 
suggested that the failure to confirm the hypothesis under 
the imagery orienting set, might have been due to the fact 
that this orienting set may have induced all subjects to 
make effective use of imagery for abstract words. In as 
much as the predicted effect was found in only one of 
four possible comparisons, the study was replicated 
(Sheehan, 1972) using only the familiarity orienting task. 
The results were consistant with previous results (Sheehan 
1971a) in that, difference scores were again significantly 
larger for the incidental group, for only the recognition 
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test. 
A third study (Sheehan, 1971b) focused its attention 
on the relevance of inter-individual differences in imagery 
ability for the occurrance of the predicted effect (greater 
difference scores for recall of concrete versus abstract 
words for incidental learners versus intentional learners). 
Subjects were screened and classified into groups of high 
and low imagers. Half of each the high and low imagery 
subjects participated in the incidental condition, while the 
remaining half of each group of subjects were given inten-
tional learning instructions. Once again, only the famil-
iarity rating task was used for lists of high and low 
imagery words. It was predicted that more cortcrete than 
abstract stimuli would be recognized in the incidental than 
in the intentional learning condition for vivid imagers, 
while the predicted effect would not be evident for sub-
jects with poor imagery ability. Additionally, it was 
predicted that, based on the findings of Ernest and 
Paivio (1971), the predicted effect should be more pro-
nounced for high imagery females relative to high imagery 
males. The results of the study (Sheehan, 1971b) indicated 
that the predicted effect was confirmed for good imagers, 
but not for poor imagers. Also, results indicated that 
incidental learning effects were rare for high imagery 
males, while the larger difference scores were associated 
with high imagery females. This latter result can be taken 
as providing confirmation of the sex differences reported 
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by Ernest and Paivio (1971). 
Sheehan (1972a) has summarized the findings of the 
three researches just discussed. The findings have been 
taken to indicate that relatively more concrete nouns 
would be recognized in incidental learning as opposed to 
abstract nouns that would be recognized in intentional 
learning. Sheehan (1972a) stated that incidental and 
intentional learning may not represent tw9 distinct pro-
cesses, and the results may indicate that sittlations in-
volving unexpected recall can benefit from visual imagery, 
to a greater extent, than those-situations where it is 
known that recall will be required. It may be the case 
that incidental learning situations are such that one is 
not only at a loss over what to recall, but also, how to 
recall. 
While it cannot be denied that imagery is an impor-
tant variable with regard to verbal learning, there is 
some question as to the significance of imagery for the 
development and production of language. One of the major 
arguments against imagery mediated language production is 
the contention that words, by in large, are generic, 
while visual images are specific. Also, it has been 
argued that images are aroused too slowly to mediate lang-
uage. Among the various arguments presented by propon-
ents of imagery mediated language production are: it 
could be that images are schematic rather than specific; 
images need not be reportable to be functional; meaning may 
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be variable rather than fixed; and finally, latencies for 
image formation may be faster than has been supposed in 
the past. The relationship between imagery and language 
has been defended by contending that meaning may be 
variable, rather than fixed (Paivio, 1971). It is assumed 
that the meaning process evoked by a word or other symbol 
is an organismic reaction with affective and/or motor 
and/or imaginal components, which may or may not be con-
scious. Further, Paivio (1971) assumes that the meaning 
reaction need not be fixed, but rather, that it may vary 
over time, dependent upon prior events and the situational 
context of the moment. Further, certain reactions to a 
symbol occur more readily than others, and it is these 
rea_ctions which come to be called the "meaning" of a symbol. 
The organismic reactions may be thought of as a series 
of transformations or elaborations occurring at four dis-
crete levels (e.g. iconic storage-no transformation; 
representational; referential-associative connections; 
associative-involves sequences of words or patterns). 
It is assumed that latency measures will reflect the avail-
ability of the above processes. 
In line with the above, Ernest & Paivio (1971a) 
asked subjects to form images or verbal associations to 
high and low imagery words, presented tachistoscopically. 
Reaction times were collected by requiring the subjects 
to press a key upon the formation of an image or verbal 
association. It was expected that verbal associative 
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reaction time should not differ for high versus low 
imagery words, while the reaction time for high imagery 
words should be substantially shorter than for low imagery 
words. Also, it was expected that, if the meaning of high 
imagery words is closely tied to imagery, both high 
and low imagery subjects should experience images to high 
imagery words, but high imagery subjects should be signi-
ficantly faster with low imagery words. Results (Ernest 
& Paivio, 1971a) indicated that the major predictions were 
confirmed, and also, that high imagery subjects reacted 
faster than low imagery subjects to both types of words. 
The latter result was interpreted to indicate that verbal 
associations can also be mediated by imagery, and further, 
that the speed of higher order meaning reactions to verbal 
stimuli is more closely related to variables that define 
imagery processes-than to those that define verbal pro-
cesses. 
However, Kintsch (1972) has reported that some differ-
ences in learning, that have been attributed to an imagery 
variable, could be due, in fact, to differences in lexical 
complexity. It was reported (Kintsch, 1972) that high 
imagery words tend to be lexically simple, while low imag-
ery words tend to be lexically complex. Therefore, it 
was suggested that learning differences between high and 
low imagery words may be due to the number of transforma-
tions required to transform a given word into its root. 
Based on this reasoning, it would seem that the differ-
ences in reaction time to high and low imagery words, de-
scribed by Ernest and Paivio (1971a) could be due to dif-
ferences in the number of transformations which are re-
quired for the associative or imaginal reactions to the 
words. 
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Studies dealing with the relationship between imagery 
and language have also been extended to include the rela-
tionship between imagery and language comprehension. Paivio 
and Begg (1971), following a two process approach to cog-
nition, reasoned that imagery should be an important com-
ponent of associative meaning for concrete, but not nec-
essarily abstract language. It was thought that the under-
standing of concrete sentences should be closely tied to 
intraverbal and associative meaning. Therefore, for con-
crete sentences, image latency should be' approximately 
equal to comprehension latency. Subjects were_shown con-
crete and abstract sentences, tachis~oscopically, and asked 
to release a button (yielding a reaction time measure) 
upon formation of an image, or upon comprehending the 
sentence. The results indicated that latency differences 
for image formation and comprehension were markedly greater 
for abstract versus concrete sentences. 
Also of interest has been research investigating the 
relationship between imagery and memory for connected dis-
course. It has been shown that, in paired associate learn-
ing, stimulus imagery is more important than response 
imagery. This fact has been interpreted as indicating that 
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imagery is most important for retrieval of information. 
The dual coding model would hold that concrete sentences 
are likely to be encoded both visually and verbally, but 
would say nothing about differences in memory for concrete 
versus abstract sentences, in that encoding errors are 
possible. Paivio (1972) has hypothesized t,hat imagery may 
either aid or hinder memory for language, dependent upon 
such factors as: the length of the units to be remembered; 
and the features to be remembered. Aiken (1971) had sub-
jects study sentences (under imagery or no imagery instruc-
tions) with two nouns underlined, for 10 seconds. The 
subjects were told that a later recall test would require 
them to respond with one of the two underlined words. 
The underlined words were high imagery, high frequency 
nouns. Two recall tests were administrered, one immediate 
and another after two and one half hours. Results in-
dicated that recall was better under imagery instructions 
than under memorization, for forward recall and dissimilar 
nouns. Additionally, meaningful similar nouns were more 
determental for imagery subjects, and imagery subjects 
·showed less memorization of sentences. It was concluded 
(Aiken, 1971) that the results supported the contention 
that visual and verbal systems are independent. Sasson and 
Fraisse (1972) found that interpolated pictures or concrete 
sentences produced about the same amount of retroactive 
interference, in recall of sentences, in both immediate and 
delayed recall conditions. In a subsequent experiment, 
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Sasson and Fraisse (1972) found that while memory for 
abstract sentences was not interfered with, by either inter-
polated pictures or interpolated concrete sentences, re-
call was impaired by interpolated abstract sen'tences. It 
was argued (Sasson & Fraisse, 1972) that these results 
indicated that abstract sentences are stored verbally, 
' while concrete sentences are stored visually. These re-
sults could also be taken as being supporttive of two major 
systems of memory. 
Phillipchalk (1972) investigated the effects of 
thematicity and abstractness on the long term recall of 
connected discourse. Subjects were presented the words 
of a short passage (abstract or concrete), one word at 
a time. Half of the subjects were told that the words 
formed a short story, while the remaining subjects were 
told that the words were randomly drawn from the dictionary. 
Subjects were tested for recall of the words immediately 
following their presentation as well as after a two week 
delay. Results indicated that thematic presentation of 
the words resulted in better recall, for the concrete 
passages only, for both immediate and delayed recall. It 
was concluded (Phillipchalk, 1972) that concrete discourse 
has unique properties not possessed by either concrete or 
abstract material, presented randomly or by abstract dis-
course. It has· been suggested that this property is the 
ability to generate a "surrogate structuren, retaining the 
central theme of the passage, from which the passage may be 
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reconstructed. In as much as the effect of thematicity 
appears to be limited to concrete discourse, could it be 
that the "surrogate structure" takes the form of some sOrt 
of interactive image? In any event, the effect of the-
maticity seems consistant with Paivio's (1971) statement, 
that the relationship between imagery and language can be 
altered by prior events and contextual considerations of 
the moment. Morris and Reid (1972) have also presented 
findings which seem consistant with the idea that the re-
lationship between imagery and language may be situational. 
Subjects read a passage which contained either high or 
low imagery value adjectives. Later, the subjects were 
asked to recall as many nouns from the passage as they 
could, in a free recall test. It was found that the imag-
ery value of the adjectives had no effect on the recall 
of nouns. The result was interpreted as indicating that 
nouns in prose material are affected by words other than 
just adjectives. If prose makes_ sense without the ad-
jectives (subjects are able to generate a thematic struc-
ture) the addition of adjectives causes little change in 
recall. These findings seem consistant with Paivio's 
(1971) suggestion, that imagery may aid in the recall of a 
general theme, and some words, but not necessarily gram-
matical form. 
Other research has investigated imagery versus deep 
structure in the memory for connected discourse. Rohrman 
(196$) has suggested that sentence recall is dependent 
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upon the deep structure properties of the sentence. Paivio 
(197lb), however, has shown sentence recall to depend upon 
the imagery value of the sentence, while being independent 
of its deep structure. Subjects were shown lists of 20 
high or low imagery nominalizations (10 subject and 10 
object), and allowed three minutes for free recall. Re-
sults indicated that subject nominalizations were unaf-
fected by imagery type, while high imagery object nomin-
alizations were recalled significantly better than low 
imagery object nominalizations. There was no effect of 
nominalization type. Results were interpreted as being 
inconsistant with Rohrman's (1968) deep structure inter-
pretations, while suggesting that imagery might be an 
important underlaying process. Also, correlations were 
computed between recall scores, for nominalization type 
and imagery type. It was found that, while nominalization 
imagery, participle imagery and noun imagery correlated 
I 
significantly with recall, noun imagery correlated most 
highly. This was interpreted as suggesting that subjects 
needed only to recall the object image in order to recon-
struct the "scene" described by the nominalization, as a 
whole. 
Also, Danks and Sorce (1973), in a prompted recall 
task, varied the deep structure complexity and the imagery 
value of the prompt word (noun of the prepositional phrase) 
independently. It was found that full passive sentences 
were better recalled than passives with the agent replaced, 
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and high imagery prompts were more effective than low 
imagery prompts. Syntax was effective for the 1·ow imagery 
condition and imagery was effective only in agent re-
placed sentences. The results were interpreted as in-
dicating that, in the high imagery condition, syntax was 
negligible, in that the subjects could image the sentence, 
while for the low imagery condition, syntax was effective, 
in that an image was not readily available. The results 
of Danks and Sorce (1973) seem consistant with results 
' 
reported by Paivio (197lb), that a subject only needs to 
image the object referent in order to reconstruct the 
scene. This suggests that passive sentences may be trans-
formed into their declarative counterparts prior to pro-
cessing. 
Paivio (1971a) contends that the maJor implication of 
the imagery approach to language, is that the acquistion of 
language may depend, initially on imagery. That is to 
say, initially, an infant's knowledge about the world is 
stored in the form of images. Eventually, language becomes 
connected to the image foundation, remaining intertwined 
with it, but developing a certain degree of autonomy. 
Syntax is also thought to develop from an imagery substrate. 
As the child sees objects interact, the relationships tend 
to repeat themselves, and eventually a sort of syntax is 
built in to the imaginal representations. Then at a later 
stage, the child learns to label the objects and the ex-
isting relations between them. Recent findings by Moser 
and Bergman (1973) seems consistant with the above posi-
tion. Subjects learned an artificial language, by means 
of sentences presented alone, or by means of sentences 
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and pictures depicting the meaning of the sentences. 
Learning occurred more rapidly for the sentences plus pic-
tures condition. Further, syntax learning did occur in the 
above condition, but did not occur in the sentences alone 
condition. Also, class membership of new words could then 
be learned by the sentences plus pictures condition, in 
a strictly verbal context, which was sometimes mediated by 
imagery. 
Having reviewed the recent literature with respect 
to research dealing with imagery, what conclusions can be 
drawn? The classical notion of visual imagery has been 
attacked and evidence presented (Neisser & Kerr, 1973) 
that visual imagery is something other than a "mental 
picture". However, the dissenters from the classical con-
ception of imagery (Pylyshyn, 1973; Neisser, 1972) admit 
to the spatiality of the imagery process, while denying 
that said spatiality is necessarily fundamental. Such a 
concession, in light of existing empirical evidence (Atwood, 
1971; Kosslyn, 1973), seems necessary. In any event, what-
ever the fundamental nature of imagery might be, it does 
appear to possess some sort of spatiality. 
When considering the function of imagery, however, 
the issues seem somewhat less resolved. It would seem 
safe to conclude that imagery represents a major system for 
human information process·ing, that is in general, facil-
itative. Further, the research investigating the effects 
of imagery in relation to incidental learning would seem 
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to indicate that imagery does not depend on motivational 
factors, in exerting its influence, nor does imagery depend 
on conscious awareness. The question, as to the root of 
the imagery effect being due to differential intraverbal 
interference, however, is unresolved. Research on bizarre-
ness and interacting images has led to inconsistant, and 
sometimes conflicting results. In this case, it might 
be wise to take note of the notion that imagery may func-
tion differently, in different tasks, and closely examine 
the methodologies used in bizarreness and interacting 
imagery research. Further, results presented by Paivio and 
Foth (1970) appear to rule out ease of encoding as an ad-
equate explanation of the imagery effect. Therefore, 
while imagery can be said to represent a major system for 
human information processing which has spatial propetties, 
and does not depend on conscious awareness or motivational 
factors, the question still remains as .to how imagery ex-
erts its effect (chunking, ease of encoding, reduction of 
interverbal interference). Hopefully, a better under-
standing as to the function and nature of imagery, will 
result in a better understanding as to how the human being 
copes with information in his everyday world. 
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